SEARCH AND SEIZURE-STOP AND FRISK-POLICE MAY SEIZE
NONTHREATENING CONTRABAND
DETECTED THROUGH THE
SENSE OF TOUCH DURING A PROTECTIVE PAT DOWN SEARCH So
LONG AS THE SEARCH STAYS WITHIN THE BOUNDS MARKED By

Terry v. Ohio--Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. 2130 (1993).
The Fourth Amendment' protects 2 individuals 3 against unreaThe Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence is a broad, diverse, and
complex area of criminal law. Recent Case, 88 DICK L. REv. 549, 551 & n.25 (1984).
While a discussion of search and seizure law in its entirety is beyond the scope of this
Note, for varied commentary on the law of search and seizure, see generally 1 JOSEPH
G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED §§ 3:1 to :65 (2d ed. 1985); JOHN
C. KLOTrER &JACQUELINE R. KANOvrTz, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4.1-.18 (5th ed. 1985);

3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
(2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1992) [hereinafter LAFAVE, A TREATISE];JACOB W. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1966); POLmvIOs G. POLYVIOU, SEARCH & SEIZURE: CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAw (1982); 2 WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND
CONFESSIONS (2d ed. 1993); THE SUPREME COURT & THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 127-

287 (John Galloway ed., 1973) [hereinafter RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED]; 1 CHARLES E.
TORCA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 142-179 (13th ed. 1989); JOSEPH A.
VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES (2d ed. 1974); MELVYN ZARR, THE BILL OF

RIGHTS AND THE POLICE 19-24 (2d ed. 1980);

1 JOHN W. HALL, JR., SEARCH AND

SEIZURE (2d ed. 1991); Harry M. Caldwell, Seizures of the Fourth Kind: Changing the
Rules, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 323 (1985); Peter Glassman & Robin Perry, D.C.C.A. Project
(pt. III), 27 How. LJ. 759 (1984); Wayne R. LaFave, Supreme Court Report: Nine Key
Decisions Expand Authority to Search and Seize, 69 A.B.A. J., 1740 (1983) [hereinafter
LaFave, Nine Key Decisions]; Richard A. Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of "Stop" and "Arrest," 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 771 (1982).
For a look at some particularized issues within the law of search and seizure, see
David M. Conner et al., Miranda Rights in a Terry Stop: The Implications of People v.
Johnson, 63 DEN. U. L. REV. 109, 110 (1985) (considering the issue of whether police

officers must inform an individual of his Miranda rights during a Tery stop); Elan
Gerstmann, Letting Katz Out of the Bag: Re-Evaluating Probable Cause in the Context of
Electronic Eavesdropping, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 193, 198 (1990)

(commenting on the

propriety of electronic eavesdropping under the Fourth Amendment); Philip S.
Greene & Brian W. Wice, The D.E.A. Drug Courier Profile: History and Analysis, 22 S.
TEX. L.J. 261, 269-85 (1982) (discussing the origin, evolution, and development of the
drug courier profile, a compilation of characteristics possessed by couriers of illicit
narcotics, and its place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Bruce D. Hausknecht,
The "Homicide Scene" Exception to the Fourth Amendment WarrantRequirement: A Dead Issue?, 71 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 289 (1980) (noting that although certain
states have adopted a homicide exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has refused to do so); Charles M.
Oberly, III, The Policeman's Duty and the Law Pertainingto Citizen Encounters, 8 PEPP. L.
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REv. 653, 683-85, 685 app. (1981) (identifying the confusion confronting police officers as they deal with stop and frisk situations in the field, and suggesting adoption
of the "Model Rules of Stop and Frisk" as a uniform standard); Emily J. Dark et al.,
Recent Decisions, Search and Seizure-Airport Drug Seizures: How the Federal Courts Strike
the Fourth Amendment Balance, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 668, 669-70 (1983) (analyzing
the constitutionality of searches and seizures where police relied on police-citizen
contacts as a basis to establish probable cause); William Edwards, Note, "Knock, Knock:
Who's There?"DoesPolice Entry of Premises by Ruse Violate the Individual'sFourthAmendment
Rights in Light ofKatz v. United States, 12 Cmi.JusT.J. 167, 167-69 (1990) (discussing
the constitutionality of police entry into an individual's home by trickery) (footnotes
omitted); William M. FitzGerald, Comment, The Constitutionality of the Canine Sniff
Search: From Katz to Dogs, 68 MARQ. L. REv. 57, 58 (1984) (analyzing whether the
Fourth Amendment permits a dog sniff search of personal property); H. David Hanes,
Note, ConstitutionalLaw: Search and Seizure: An Analysis of Federaland Oklahoma Law in
Light of Recent Chicago Strip Search Cases, 34 OKLA. L. REv. 312, 312-13 (1981) (analyzing
and comparing federal and Oklahoma law with regard to the constitutionality of personal strip searches conducted incident to routine traffic offenses); Kim A. Lambert,
Note, United States v. Jacobsen: Expanded Private Search Doctrine UnderminingFourth
Amendment Values, 16 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 359-60 (1985) (discussing the Supreme
Court's decision to uphold a government search of personal property where that
property had already been exposed to a private search); A.M. Rybicki, Comment,
What Standard Governs Investigative Stops in Virginia?, 9 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 313
(1987) (examining current stop and frisk law in Virginia and comparing it to its federal counterpart); Barbara Tarlow, Comment, Dog Sniff Searches and United States v.
Thomas: The Second Circuit Takes a Needed Bite Out of Place, 19 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1097
(1986) (analyzing United States v. Thomas, where the Supreme Court declared that dog
sniff searches violate individual privacy in certain circumstances, in light of United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)) (citing United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 819 (1985)).
2 The protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment are not self-executing.
Keith A. Fabi, Comment, The Exclusionary Rule: Not the "ExpressedJuice of the WoollyHeaded Thistle," 35 Burr. L. REv. 937, 937 (1986) (footnote omitted). To ensure that
the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would
not be an empty promise, the Supreme Court established an exclusionary rule that
allows for the suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence. Id. The Supreme Court
first recognized this exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914). Fabi, supra, at 942. In Weeks, the government unlawfully seized documents,
and subsequently attempted to introduce the documents at trial as evidence pointing
to defendant's guilt. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386, 388. Writing for the Court, Justice Day
held that evidence seized by federal officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment
could not be used at a criminal trial when timely motion was made for such evidence
to be returned. Id. at 389, 398.
Almost fifty years after Weeks, the Supreme Court, in Mapp v. Ohio, held that the
exclusionary rule applied to the states as well as the federal government. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 660 (1961). For insightful analyses of the Fourth Amendment's "exclusionary rule," its development, evolution, and gradual demise, see generally BRADFORD P. WILSON, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: AJURISPRUDENTIAL
HISTORY 45-105 (1986); Gerard V. Bradley, Present at the Creation?A Critical Guide to
Weeks v. United States and its Progeny, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1031 (1986); Fabi, supra;
Stanley Ingber, Defending the Citadel: The DangerousAttack of "ReasonableGood Faith", 36
VAND. L. REv. 1511 (1983) ;James T. Ranney, The Exclusionary Rule-The Illusion vs. The

Reality, 46 MONT. L. REv. 289 (1985); William A. Schroeder, DeterringFourthAmendment
Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. LJ. 1361 (1981); Potter Stewart,
The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclu-
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sionary Rule in Search-And-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (1983); Michael Vitiello & Jane C. Burger, Mapp's Exclusionary Rule: Is the Court Crying Wol?, 86 DICK. L.
REv. 15 (1981); Harvey Wingo, Reuriting Mapp and Miranda: A Preferencefor Due Process, 31 KAN. L. REv. 219 (1983).
3 "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Fourth Amendment protection extends to the individual's
property as well as to the individual himself. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In addition, the

Fourth Amendment protects all citizens, whether criminal or law-abiding, from governmental intrusions. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392 ("This protection reaches all alike,
whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.").
4 A search is defined as:
[A] n examination of a person's house or other buildings or premises, or
of his person, or of his vehicle, aircraft, etc., with a view to the discovery
of contraband or illicit or stolen property, or some evidence of guilt to
be used in the prosecution of a criminal action for some crime or offense with which he is charged.
BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 1349 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted). Early in this century,
the property law concept of a "trespass" controlled the notion of a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment. SeeHALL, supra note 1, §§ 1.8-1.9, at 16, 17. Therefore, whether
a search was in violation of Fourth Amendment proscriptions depended on whether it
constituted a trespass in violation of property law. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the trespass doctrine under Fourth Amendment
search and seizure cases, see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928)
(recognizing that at one time "unless there [had] been an official search and seizure
of [a] person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an
actual physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage'", no Fourth Amendment violation
existed); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 131-32, 134-35 (1942) (concluding
that evidence of conversations obtained through the use of a dictaphone were not
illegal by unlawful entry or trespass). In 1967, however, the Supreme Court overruled
both Olmstead and Goldman in the celebrated case of Katz v. United States. Katz, 389
U.S. at 352-53. Specifically, the Katz Court concluded that the notion that property
interests governed the right to search and seize had been discredited. Id. at 353
(quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). The Katz Court further
stated that "the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our
subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be
regarded as controlling." Id. The Katz Court replaced the trespass doctrine with the
.expectation of privacy" standard. Id. at 360, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also
COOK, supra note 1, § 2.1, at 36 (commenting that, since Katz, the Court has emphasized the protection of "reasonable expectations of privacy"). Justice Harlan characterized the "expectation of privacy" standard as requiring a dual analysis. Katz, 389
U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Justice noted that a person "must have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. Therefore, as
Justice Stewart noted, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject to Fourth Amendment protection.... But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted). For later application of the
.expectation of privacy" doctrine, see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448, 449, 450
(1989) (finding no search where officers discovered marijuana while flying over an
individual's greenhouse at 400 feet because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy from observations capable of being made by the naked eye); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (stating that no search occurred where police
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viewed an individual's marijuana crop by flying over a yard at 1000 feet because there
is no expectation of privacy from an aerial viewing of a yard); Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229, 239 (1986) (holding that no search occurred where
officers of the Environmental Protection Agency took aerial photographs of chemical
plant with a high precision camera because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in an area analogous to an open field, and the camera only enhanced the senses)
(footnote omitted); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111-12, 126 (1984)
(opening a container of cocaine did not constitute a search where container had
already been opened by a private party and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officers
were already aware of its contents); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 767-68, 773
(1983) (reopening a sealed container first opened by customs officials who informed
police of the container's contents was not a search because there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in objects already viewed under lawful authority); United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (stating there was no search where officers
followed an automobile on a public highway with the assistance of a monitoring device because a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements on a public road, and the use of a device which merely enhances the senses did
not make an otherwise lawful action a search); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745
(1979) (holding that utilization of a pen register was not a search because there is no
legitimate expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed). For discussions of the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" doctrine, see Laurence A. Benner, Diminishing
Expectations of Privacy in the Rehnquist Court, 22J. MARSHALL L. REv. 825, 825 (1989)
(noting that the Supreme Court has subordinated individual privacy rights to law enforcement's need for discretion); Don Mayer, Workplace Privacy and the Fourth Amendment: An End to Reasonable Expectations?, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 625 (1992) (exploring
reasonable expectations of privacy in the workplace); BrianJ. Serr, Great Expectations of
Privacy: A New Model for FourthAmendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REv. 583, 584 (1989)
(noting that the Court's recent promotion of law enforcement interests has diminished individual privacy rights); James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake:
Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J.
645, 647 (1985) (arguing that the Court's "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard is unduly narrow and does not provide the private individual with adequate protection); Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy": An
EmergingTripartiteAnalysis, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1077 (1987) (examining the law of search
and seizure in the wake of Katz); Tom Bush, Comment, A Privacy-Based Analysis for
Warrantless Aerial Surveillance Cases, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1767, 1767 (1987) (maintaining
that courts have abandoned the policies encompassed in Katz by relying on property
law concepts to decide the constitutionality of aerial searches); Isabel Gilman, Comment, Open Air Searches and Enhanced Surveillance in California, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
779 (1981) (concluding that California courts consistently rely on the property law
trespass doctrine to measure the constitutionality of governmental action under a
Fourth Amendment challenge); Sharon L. Hightower, Comment, Warrantless Aerial
Surveillance: A New Dimension, 16 LINCOLN L. REv. 199, 199-205 (1986) (highlighting
the evolutionary process of the Supreme Court's decision in Ciraolo);Daniel W. Johnson, Comment, Aerial Surveillance: A Birds-Eye View of Katz v. United States, 22 GONZ.L.
REv. 393, 395 (1987) (discussing the inconsistencies between Katz and its progeny);
Jon E. Lemole, Note, From Katz to Greenwood: Abandonment Gets Recycled from the Trash
Pile-Can Our Garbage be Saved from the Court's Rummaging Hands?, 41 CASE W. REs. L.

REv. 581, 583 (1991) (scrutinizing the Supreme Court's charge that a person has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in things voluntarily conveyed to third parties);
Gregory E. Sopkin, Comment, The Police Have Become Our Nosy Neighbors: Florida v.
Riley and Other Supreme Court Deviationsfrom Katz, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 407, 407-08
(1991) (exploring the Supreme Court's deviation from the "reasonable expectation
of privacy" doctrine promulgated in Katz); Jackie C. Wiest, The United States
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Supreme Court Review, Illinois v. Andreas: Is There a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in
a Sealed Container?,11 OHio N.U. L. REv. 803 (1984) (considering whether an individual may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a sealed container
discovered in a private lawful search).
5 A "seizure" of property "occurs when 'there is some meaningful interference
with an individual's possessory interest in that property.'" Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois, 113 S. Ct. 538, 543 (1992) (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113). A seizure of a
person is defined as "[t]he taking of one physically or constructively into custody and
detaining him, thus causing a deprivation of his freedom in a significant way, with real
interruption of his liberty of movement." BLACK'S LAw DicrIONARY 1359 (6th ed.
1990) (citation omitted); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) ("Only
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred.");
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27 (1969) (recognizing that seizures of persons
include all intrusions upon personal security, whether those intrusions take the form
of arrests, investigatory detentions, or any other official restraints of the individual's
liberty) (citation and footnote omitted); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
554 (1980) ("[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.") (footnote omitted).
In Mendenha, the Court noted that:
Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where
the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence
of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical
touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of
voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled.
Id. (citations omitted). The Mendenhall formulation is presently "the benchmark
against which all nonphysical personal seizures are measured." RINGEL, supra note 1,
§ 13.2(a), at 13-11. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held several restraints of
persons to be "seizures" under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (pronouncing that a permissible seizure occurs when
an individual is detained during a search of his or her home) (footnotes omitted);
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 88-89, 96 (1979) (noting that an unlawful seizure occurs
where an individual is frisked pursuant to a warrant to search the premises in which
he is located); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 206-07 (1979) (declaring that
subjecting an individual to a custodial interrogation constitutes a seizure); Terry, 392
U.S. at 16 (stating that a seizure occurs where an officer stops and frisks a citizen on
the street).
As a general rule, the brevity of a detention does not prevent it from constituting
a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653
(1979) (citations omitted). Pursuant to Mendenhall however, governmental action
that previously might have constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure is now deemed a
seizure only if the individual reasonably believed that he was not permitted to leave.
Mendenhall 446 U.S. at 554 (footnote omitted). For example, in INS v. Delgado, the
Supreme Court declared that individuals who were questioned about their identity
were not seized because the circumstances surrounding the encounter were not so
intimidating as to make a reasonable person believe that he was not free to leave had
he not responded. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see alsoJacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (ruling that Fourth
Amendment proscriptions apply only to the government and its agents, not to private
citizens) (citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)) (footnote omitted); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554
(1976) (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects against arbitrary and oppres-
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quently, the touchstone inquiry in a Fourth Amendment challenge
is whether a particular search or seizure is reasonable. 7 Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court adhered to a rather narrow
view8 of what was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.9 Acsive governmental intrusion into an individual's privacy and personal security) (citations omitted); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 146 (1925) (ruling that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect against warrantless searches, only unreasonable
ones).
7 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
19); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 618 (1989)
(declaring that when determining the intrusiveness of a government's drug or alcohol
testing program, any restriction on an employee's freedom to move that is needed to
obtain a blood, breath, or urine sample must be considered) (citation omitted);
HALL, supra note 1, § 1.18, at 27 (noting that "reasonableness" has long been the
Court's starting point when resolving Fourth Amendment conflicts between the government and its citizens).
Reasonable is defined as:
Fair, proper, just, moderate, suitable under the circumstances. Fit and
appropriate to the end in view. Having the faculty of reason; rational;
governed by reason; under the influence of reason; agreeable to reason.
Thinking, speaking, or acting according to the dictates of reason. Not
immoderate or excessive, being synonymous with rational, honest, equitable, fair, suitable, moderate, tolerable.
BLACK'S LAw DICrONARY 1265 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted). For an analysis of
the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment, see infranotes 8-16 and
accompanying text.
8 The linguistics of the Fourth Amendment create a question of construction.
Cathy A. Cox et al., An EmergingNew Standardfor WarrantlessSearches and Seizures Based
on Terry v. Ohio, 35 MERCER L. Rv. 647, 649 (1984) (footnote omitted). The amendment itself is said to consist of two conjunctive clauses, the "reasonableness" clause
and the "warrant" clause. Id. Consequently, problems of interpretation arise because
the clauses may either be construed as dependent or as independent. Id. at 649-50
(footnote omitted). The historical confusion surrounding the proper construction of
the Fourth Amendment has been explained as follows:
If it is found that a search within the constitutional term has taken
place, it will have to be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment and
will only be upheld if it is consistent with its requirements. The Amendment, as we have seen, contains two clauses, the first forbidding 'unreasonable searches and seizures' and the second requiring that warrants
should only be issued on the basis of certain conditions, more particularly that they should proceed on the basis of probable cause and that
they should meet certain tests of specificity. But what are "unreasonable" searches and seizures? And what is the place and relevance of the
warrant process as regards determinations of reasonableness? The difficulty is that there is almost no evidence concerning the crucial issue of
the relationship between the two sections of the Amendment. Grammatically, both of the two main views with regard to the reasonableness
of searches are plausible. On one view the second clause is an explanation of the first, so that any search without a warrant is unreasonable.
Conversely, one could say that, linguistically, the two clauses are quite
distinct and that therefore there is no necessary textual relationship between them, the second section only addressing those searches in fact
conducted under warrants and saying nothing either about when a war-
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cordingly, the Court avowed that, subject to a few firmly established exceptions, 10 searches and seizures were per se
rant is necessary or about what other circumstances can make a search
reasonable and lawful.
POLyVWOU, supra note 1, at 130 (footnotes omitted).
Due to this historical controversy, two broad views have emerged regarding the
reasonableness of searches and seizures. Id. at 131 (footnote omitted). The first view
is that the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches, not warrantless
ones. Id. Therefore, because there is no exact definition of the term "reasonableness, it must be determined in light of the particular facts of each case. Id. This
view, of course, affords the judiciary great flexibility in its conclusions regarding
Fourth Amendment inquiries. Id. (footnote omitted). The second view, preferred by
the Supreme Court, holds that "reasonableness" under the Fourth Amendment depends on the existence of a lawfully issued warrant. Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, a
search and seizure is reasonable only if executed pursuant to a warrant. Id. (footnote
omitted).
9 See, Cox et al., supra note 8, at 651 (stating that the Court adhered to the view
that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the reasonableness of a search or
seizure was conditioned upon the existence of a valid warrant).
10 Notwithstanding the precise language of Justice Stewart's opinion in Katz, the
exceptions thus far acknowledged by the Court are neither "few" nor "well-delineated." Hausknecht, supra note 1, at 289. The Supreme Court has thus far recognized
the following exceptions to the warrant requirement:
(1) The search incidental to arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763
(1969). In Chimel, the Court refused to uphold the search of an individual's home
pursuant to his valid arrest where that search went beyond the arrestee's person and
the area within his immediate control. Id. at 753-54, 768. In so doing, the Court
declared that an arresting officer may only search an arrested person to discover and
remove weapons and to seize evidence. Id. at 762-63. Furthermore, the Court pronounced that the officer may search the area within the suspect's "immediate control," meaning the area from which the suspect "might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence." Id. at 763.
In New York v. Belton, the Court reaffirmed its decision in Chimel, holding that an
officer's search of an arrestee's jacket, located inside the arrestee's vehicle, was valid
because the passenger compartment of the vehicle, as well as its contents, were within
the immediate control of the arrestee. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63
(1981). Although the concept of a warrantless search incidental to a valid arrest was
not fully established until Chimel, the Court first recognized this notion in Weeks v.
United States. See LANDYNSKi, supra note 1, at 87 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 398 (1914)). In Weeks, the Court held that where an accused made a seasonable application for the return of items unlawfully seized from his home, a federal
court could not retain those items for the purpose of the accused's prosecution. Id.
For a more in depth analysis of the search incidental to arrest, see COOK, supra note 1,
§ 2.14, at 106-16; LAN1vNs~i, supra note 1, at 87-107; POLYvlou, supra note 1, at 133-62;
ZARR, supra note 1, at 20.
(2) The search of an automobile based on probable cause. Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). In Carroll, the Supreme Court held that where an
officer has probable cause to believe that an automobile contains contraband, but
cannot obtain a warrant due to the exigency of the circumstances, the officer may
search the automobile and seize any contraband found inside. Id. at 155, 156 (citations omitted).
The Court reexamined the validity of a warrantless automobile search in Chambers v. Maroney. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 43 (1970). The Chambers Court
expanded the scope of the automobile exception by upholding the validity of a sta-
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tion house search of a vehicle where officers had probable cause to believe that contraband was inside. Id. at 52. Although the officers had transported the vehicle to the
station house, the Court held that the vehicle's mobility created exigent circumstances which justified a warrantless search. Id. In addition, the Court held that if
probable cause and exigent circumstances existed when the vehicle was stopped, then
the vehicle could lawfully be searched at anytime thereafter without a warrant. Id.;
accord Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 67-68 (1975) (per curiam) (holding that where
police had probable cause to search the defendant's car at a drive-thru bank window,
probable cause to search without a warrant still existed when the car was later impounded at the police station).
Later, in Colorado v. Bannister, the Court held that where an officer observed an
item in a vehicle that had been lawfully stopped for a traffic violation, and where he
had probable cause to believe the item was contraband, the mobility of a lawfully
detained vehicle permitted an officer to seize contraband found inside the vehicle
without a warrant. Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
In United States v. Chadwick, however, the Court focused not on the inherent mobility
2of an automobile and the exigency created thereby, but turned instead to the "expectation of privacy" standard previously enunciated in Katz. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11, 12, 13 (1977).
In Chadwick, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a warrantless
station house search of a double-locked trunk found inside the passenger compartment of an arrestee's automobile. Id. at 4-5, 6. Invalidating the search, the Court
reasoned that the arrestees had manifested an expectation that the contents of the
trunk would remain free from public examination. Id. at 4-5, 11. Thus, the Court
noted, the search was not justified under the rationale of the "automobile exception"
because expectations of privacy in personal luggage were substantially greater than
those in an automobile. Id. at 13. Therefore, the Court concluded, the arrestees
deserved the protection guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Id. at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
In 1979, however, the Court returned to the exigency justification for warrantless
automobile searches when it decided Arkansas v. Sanders. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 766 (1979). Affirming the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision to suppress
marijuana found in the respondent's luggage, the Sanders Court held that, in the
absence of exigent circumstances, police were required to obtain a warrant before
searching luggage taken from a properly stopped automobile. Id. at 755, 766. In so
holding, the Court distinguished between automobiles and other private property by
emphasizing the inherent mobility of an automobile, as well as the diminished privacy
expectation that one customarily has while in a vehicle. Id. at 761 (citations omitted).
The Court therefore refused to uphold the seizure of Sanders's luggage because there
were no exigent circumstances making the obtainment of a warrant impracticable. Id.
at 766. The Court noted, however, that a warrant would not be required where the
societal costs of requiring a warrant, such as the risk of losing evidence or danger to
the officer, outweighed the reasons for prior judicial approval of the search. Id. at
759-60 (citation omitted). The tug-of-war between these two competing interests
would become the primary concern underlying the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment analysis. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's attempts to strike the proper balance between the needs of the government
and the rights of its citizens).
The Supreme Court later manifested a change of heart with regard to the warrantless search of a container found in a lawfully stopped and searched automobile in
United States v. Ross. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824, 825 (1982). In Ross, the
Court declared that where police had probable cause to search a vehicle, they could
conduct a warrantless search of any items found inside, including all containers and
packages that may have contained the object of the search. Id. at 825. In reaching
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this conclusion, the Court emphasized that the scope of the search is defined by the
item sought and the places in which it might reasonably be found. Id. at 824.
Finally, in Californiav. Acevedo, the Supreme Court eliminated the distinction previously drawn between probable cause to search a vehicle itself, as in Ross, and probable cause to search only a container located in a vehicle, as in Sanders and Chadwick.
California v. Acevedo, 111 U.S. 1982, 1991 (1991). The Acevedo Court pronounced a
bright line rule that authorized an officer to execute a warrantless search of a
container found within an automobile based on either probable cause to search the
vehicle or probable cause to search the container alone. Id. at 1991 (quoting Ross,
456 U.S. at 824).
For an insightful look into the law of search and seizure of automobiles, see generally COOK, supra note 1, at § 3:28, at 548-52; LANDYNSKI, supra note 1, at 87-98;
POLYVIOU, supra note 1, at 162-76; Glassman & Perry, supra note 1; see also William F.
Baker, Note, The Bright Lines Must Be Dimmed Once Again: Reasonable Suspicion Searches
of Automobiles Under the New York State Constitution,38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1251, 1255-56
(1987) (contending that the Supreme Court's decisions regarding automobile
searches afford citizens little protection and praising New York State for affording its
citizenry greater constitutional protection); George C. Carr, Note, 22 CUMB. L. REv.
371, 371-85 (1992) (analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in Acevedo, and supporting the Court's conclusion as a proper balance between "requiring sufficient probable
cause and . . . allowing judicial discretion to exclude evidence"); Todd P. Guthrie,
Note, California v. Acevedo: Now You See It, Now You Don't-The Supreme Court's Latest
Approach to the FourthAmendment Warrant Requirement, 45 ARK. L. REV. 397, 423 (1992)
(concluding that the Court's decision in Acevedo was unnecessary because the
abundancy of exceptions surrounding the automobile search warrant as well as the
ease in which an officer may determine that probable cause exists effectively nullify
such a requirement); Jeffrey 0. Himstreet, Note, The Executive's War on Crime Takes a
Bite Out of Privacy in California v. Acevedo, 28 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 195, 222 (1991)
(criticizing Acevedo as a decision which virtually guarantees that individual privacy will
play a subordinate role in the war on crime); Daniel Oates, Comment, Daniel Oates,
Comment, Automobile Search Without Probable Cause-Michigan v. Long, 2 N.Y.L. SCH.
HUM. RTS. ANN. 353 (1985) (analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v.
Long); Gerard A. Pizarro, Comment, California v. Acevedo: The Emerging Role of Law
Enforcement Officers: Acting as Magistrate, 13 W. ST. U. CraM. JUST. J. 367, 384 (1992)
(calling the Acevedo Court's abolishment of the warrant requirement "a high price for
expeditious searches and police convenience"); Peter C. Prynkiewicz, Comment, California v. Acevedo: The Court Establishes One Rule to Govern All Automobile Searches and
Opens the Door to Another "FrontalAssault" on the Warrant Requirement, 67 NoTRE DAME L.

REV. 1269, 1281, 1286 (1992) (contending that the logical extension of Acevedo will be
to other public places); Steven D. Soden, Note, Expansion of the "Automobile Exception"
to the WarrantRequirement: PoliceDiscretion Replaces the "Neutraland Detached Magistrate",
57 Mo. L. REv. 661, 681 (1992) (arguing that Acevedo could have been decided without considering the constitutionality of warrantless automobile searches); John D.
Williamson, Note, CriminalProcedure: The United States Supreme Court Expands the Automobile Exception-What PriceDo We Payfor the Use of Motorized Transportation?,31 WASHBURN L.J. 405, 414 (1992) (asserting that as a result of Acevedo, the scope of the
automobile exception is ambiguous).
(3) The search pursuant to hot pursuit. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99
(1967) (citation omitted). In Hayden, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a
warrantless search of a home, entered by officers in hot pursuit of an armed felon. Id.
at 297-98. In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that "'the exigencies of the
situation made that course imperative.'" Id. at 298 (quoting McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). Before Hayden, however, the Court had held that
the unique sanctity of the home precluded officers from entering to make a felony
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unreasonable if executed without a warrant."
arrest without a validly issued warrant. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588-89, 603
(1980) (citations omitted).
(4) The warrantless seizure of potentially incriminating evidence based on the
"plain view" doctrine. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). In
Coolidge, the Supreme Court held that an officer may seize evidence not specified in a
warrant so long as (i) the initial intrusion is supported by a warrant or an exception
thereto; (ii) the object is discovered inadvertently; and (iii) the incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent. Id. at 466, 467, 469 (footnote omitted).
Later, the Court applied the Coolidge "plain view" doctrine in Washington v. Chrisman. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1982) (citations omitted). In Chrisman, an officer accompanied an arrestee to his dormitory room to retrieve
identification. Id. at 3. While standing in the doorway, the officer spotted a bag of
marijuana on a table in the room. Id. at 3-4. Consequently, the officer entered the
room and seized the marijuana. Id. at 4. The Chrisman Court held that an officer
could lawfully remain at the elbow of an arrestee and could seize, without a warrant,
any contraband that came within his plain view. Id. at 6, 9 (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court revisited the "plain view" doctrine again in Texas v. Brown.
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735 (1983). Clarifying the "immediately apparent" requirement previously enunciated in Coolidge, the Brown Court explained that such
language did not require a police officer to "know" that certain items were contraband or evidence of crime. Id. at 741. Instead, the Court concluded that the officer
need only have probable cause to associate the items with criminal activity. Id. at 74142 (citations and footnote omitted); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987)
(holding that probable cause is required to invoke the "plain view" doctrine in the
context of a seizure).
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement with regard to the "plain
view" doctrine occurred in Horton v. California, Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,
142 (1990). In Horton, the Court eliminated the "inadvertency" requirement previously enunciated in Coolidge. Id. at 141. Specifically, the Horton Court upheld the
warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view, despite that its discovery was not inadvertent. Id. at 139. The Horton Court noted thatJustice Stewart's findings with regard to
the "plain view" doctrine in Coolidge had not commanded a majority of the Court's
support, and that a plurality of the Supreme Court had subsequently established that
the inadvertency requirement was not binding precedent. Id. at 136.
For discussions pertaining to the "plain view" doctrine, see generally Robert Eyer,
Comment, The Plain View Doctrine After Horton v. California: Fourth Amendment Concerns and the Problem of Pretext, 96 DICK. L. Ruv. 467 (1992); Dale J. Gilsinger, Comment, Oklahoma's Plain View Rule: Licensing Unreasonable Searches and Seizures?, 18
TULSA L.J. 674 (1983); Richard J. Hall, Note, Fourth Amendment-Eliminating the Inadvertent Discovery Requirement for Seizures Under the Plain View Doctrine, 81 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGv 819 (1991); Grover D. Merritt, Note, 67 MaRQ. L. Rv. 366 (1984);
Loren K Newman, Comment, Horton v. California: Searchingfor a Good Cause, 46 U.
MtAi i L. REv. 455 (1991);Joel Schwartz, Comment, The Inadvertence Requirement of the
Plain View Doctrine in Horton v. California: A ForeseeableEnd?, 21 Sw. U. L. Rxv. 225
(1992).
(5) Searches authorized by consent. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
550-51 (1980). In Mendenhall, the Court noted that where an individual had expressly
consented to a search, a warrantless search pursuant to that consent was automatically
valid under the Fourth Amendment. Id. For a more in-depth discussion of the consent exception to the warrant requirement, see CooK, supra note 1, § 3:38, at 622-37;
PoLvvIou, supra note 1, at 205-16; Z~AR, supra, note 1, at 20.
11 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). The Court's
preference for a narrow reading of the Fourth Amendment derived from the Court's
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In recent years, however, the Court has moved towards a more
expansive interpretation, 1 2 concluding that the reasonableness of a
search or seizure turns on the propriety of the intrusion in light of
the circumstances, rather than on the existence of probable
cause1 3 or a warrant.1 4 Consequently, the Court has determined
vehement protection of the right to privacy. SeeJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14 (1948) (stating that only a judicial officer, not a government agent or a police
officer, shall determine when the right to privacy must yield to the government's right
to search). Such protection is guaranteed because a valid warrant may be issued only
by a neutral and detached magistrate. Id. (footnote omitted); see also Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (emphasizing the importance of the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Holmes
stated:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To
protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must
be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id.; cf Williamson, supra note 1, at 771 ("There is, perhaps, no aspect of criminal
jurisprudence more important than that which governs the decision to deprive an
individual of his or her freedom of movement prior to adjudication of guilt or innocence.") (footnote omitted).
12 See supra notes 8-9 (explaining the confusion surrounding the conflicting interpretations of the Fourth Amendment). By "liberal interpretation" of the amendment,
this Note refers to the Court's preference to view the "reasonableness" clause and the
.warrant" clause as independent in nature. See Hausknecht, supranote 1, at 289 (stating that the Supreme Court has opted for a liberal interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, and has expanded upon the exceptions to the warrant requirement to
avoid inequitable results) (footnote omitted). But see PoLYViOu, supra note 1, at 130
(concluding that the Court prefers a narrow interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment).
Then-Justice Rehnquist championed this liberal interpretation in Robbins v. California, stating that "nothing in the Fourth Amendment itself requires that searches be
conducted pursuant to warrants .... The terms of the Amendment simply mandate
that the people be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, and that any warRobbins v. Califorrants which may issue shall only issue upon probable cause ....
nia, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
13 Probable cause is defined as:
Reasonable grounds for belief that a person should be arrested or
searched. The evidentiary criterion necessary to sustain an arrest or the
issuance of an arrest or search warrant. "Probable cause" to arrest exists
where facts and circumstances within officers' knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves
to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense
has been or is being committed; it is not necessary that the officer possess knowledge of facts sufficient to establish guilt, but more than mere
suspicion is required .... Probable cause is the existence of circum-
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that an otherwise invalid search or seizure15 may be deemed reasonable if the government's interest in the intrusion outweighs the
1 6
individual's right to Fourth Amendment protection.
stances which would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe in guilt
of arrested party; mere suspicion or belief, unsupported by facts or circumstances, is insufficient.... It permits an officer to arrest one for a
felony without a warrant. Probable cause justifying officer's arrest without warrant has been defined as situation where officer has more evidence favoring suspicion that a person is guilty of crime than evidence
against such suspicion, but there is some room for doubt....
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). Under the traditional definition, probable cause existed if trustworthy information sufficiently gave
rise to a reasonable belief that an offense had been committed. See Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) (Probable cause exists where " ' the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed.") (quoting
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). According to the Carrolldefinition, probable cause exists when an officer possesses evidence sufficient to establish
greater than a 50% probability that criminal activity has occurred or is presently afoot.
Patrick K. Emerson, Note, United States v. Place: The Terry Balancing Test and Independent Seizures of Airport Luggage, 2 COOLEY L. REv. 399, 403 n.28 (1984).
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has diluted this traditional formulation by
referring to probable cause as a "fair probability" or "substantial chance" of criminal
activity. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 244 n.13 (1983) (stating that a magistrate need only determine whether there is "a probability or substantial chance of
criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity"); New York v. P.J. Video, Inc.,
475 U.S. 868, 877-78 (1986) (same).
14 Cox et al., supra note 8, at 650.
15 An invalid search or seizure is one that is not justified by the existence of a
validly issued warrant or an exception thereto. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (citation and
footnote omitted).
16 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967). Camara involved the
warrantless search of an individual's dwelling by housing inspectors. Id. at 525-26.
Considering the validity of such a search, the Court departed from traditional search
and seizure analysis and, instead, focused on the "governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen." Id. at 534-35. The Court determined that a search not pursuant to
either probable cause or a warrant regarding individual premises was "reasonable" if
the legislature or administrative agency had found probable cause to conduct an areawide inspection. Id. at 538. The need for an inspection, the Court articulated, must
be considered in terms of the reasonableness of enforcing the goals of the housing
code. Id. at 535. The CamaraCourt stated, therefore, that if a public interest warrants
the contemplated intrusion, probable cause exists. Id. at 539 (citation omitted). Writing for the Court, Justice White concluded that no "ready test" for determining the
'reasonableness" of a search under the now independently suspended first clause existed, "other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entailed." Id. at 536-37. In short, the Court opined that balancing competing
public and private interests best fulfilled the Fourth Amendment's purpose to free the
individual from "unreasonable government invasions of privacy." Id. at 539 (citation
omitted). For a more in depth discussion of the Camara decision, see infra note 70.
The unyielding tug-of-war between governmental needs and private interests has
long plagued Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence. See ZARR, supra note 1, at 24 (stating
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The adoption of this balancing test in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence evidenced the Court's conviction that law enforcement objectives 7 must often outweigh the stringent demands of
the amendment's probable cause requirement. 18 Specifically, the
Court has recognized that a police officer must be afforded the
authority to conduct a limited pat down search based on evidence
falling short of probable cause for arrest. 9 Thus, a police officer
may conduct a limited stop 20 and frisk2 of an individual based on a
that the tension between the liberty interest of the individual and the needs of law
enforcement have strained Fourth Amendment analysis); see also Pizarro, supra note
10, at 367 (noting that recent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the struggle between the state's need for vigorous law enforcement and the individual's right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures).
17 The Supreme Court has recognized the legitimacy of several law enforcement
objectives. See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 234 (1985) (pronouncing
that the investigation of completed felonies is a legitimate governmental objective);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (noting that crime prevention is a legitimate law enforcement objective); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968)
(stating that protection of the officer in the field is a compelling governmental
interest).
18 Terry, 392 U.S. at 10, 11. Notwithstanding the CamaraCourt's attempt to limit
its holding to regulatory inspections, the decision nonetheless opened a Pandora's
box of balancing governmental needs against individual rights. Cox et al., supranote
8, at 653. Not surprisingly, then, the Court revisited the Camara holding in Terry, and
utilized the balancing test to uphold the warrantless stop and frisk of an individual
reasonably suspected of criminal activity, notwithstanding the absence of probable
cause. Id. at 653-55. As ChiefJustice Warren stated, "we cannot blind ourselves to the
need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims
of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest." Terry, 392
U.S. at 24. For a closer look at Terry, see infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
For a definition of "probable cause," see supra note 13.
19 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. In Terry, Chief Justice Warren stated that:
There must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search
for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual
for a crime.
Id.
20 A stop is defined as occurring "when [a] police officer restrains [a] person's liberty by physical force or show of authority ....

"

BLACK'S LAw DICTnONARY 1420 (6th

ed. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Rybicki, supra note 1, at 313 n.1 ("An investigative stop is a brief detention of an individual, not amounting to an arrest, for the
purpose of an investigation or prevention of the individual's suspected criminal activity."). Unlike an arrest, for which probable cause is required, an investigative stop
may be based on reasonable or articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
21 A frisk is defined as:
Contact of the outer clothing of a person to detect by the sense of touch
whether a concealed weapon is being carried.... A pat-down search of
a suspect by police, designed to discover weapons for purpose of insuring safety of officer and others nearby, and not to recover contraband
or other evidence for use at subsequent trial. The scope of a frisk has
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reasonable suspicion 22 that crime is afoot and that the confronted
been limited by the courts to be less than a full-scale search. In determining whether a police officer has a basis for initiating a frisk, there
are two matters to be considered. One concerns whether the officer
had a sufficient degree of suspicion that the party frisked was armed
and dangerous, and the other whether the officer was rightfully in the
presence of the party frisked so as to be endangered if that person was
armed.
BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 668 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted); see also RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED, supra note 1, at 158 n.* (describing a frisk as where: "The officer must feel
with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search must be
made of ... arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and the area about the
testicles, and entire surface of legs down to the feet."). The following excerpt from a
police procedure manual also provides an example instruction on how to conduct a
proper protective weapons frisk:
Check the subject's neck and collar. A check should be made under the
subject's arm. Next a check should be made of the upper back. The
lower back should also be checked. A check should be made of the
upper part of the man's chest and the lower region around the stomach. The belt, a favorite concealment spot, should be checked. The
inside thigh and crotch area also should be searched. The legs should
be searched for possible weapons. The last items to be checked are the
shoes and cuffs of the subject.
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2140 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quotation
omitted).
22 Reasonable suspicion is:
[a] quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce [an] ordinarily prudent
and cautious man under [the] circumstances to believe criminal activity
is at hand.... It must be based on specific and articulable facts, which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant intrusion.
BLACK'S LAw DICrioNARv 1266 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted); see also, Rybicki,
supra note 1, at 314 (noting that reasonable suspicion "amounts to something more
than a hunch and less than probable cause") (footnote omitted). In Terry, the Court
described "reasonable suspicion" as follows:
[I]njustifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when
it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny
of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search
or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that
assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the action taken was appropriate?
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (citations and footnotes omitted). A list of factors which may
give rise to reasonable suspicion for a stop include:
A. The Person's Appearance. Does he generally fit the description of a
person wanted for a known offense? Does he appear to be suffering
from a recent injury, or to be under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or
other intoxicants?
B. The Person's Actions. Is he running away from an actual or possible
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individual is armed and dangerous.23
While the Court's vindication of the right to stop and frisk
originally derived from the need to protect police officers in the
24
field and to allow officers to detect and prevent criminal activity,
the law of stop and frisk has been extended far beyond the point at
which these concerns are initially triggered. 25 For example, the
crime scene? Is he otherwise behaving in a manner indicating possible
criminal conduct? If so, in what way? Were incriminating statements or
conversations overheard? Is he with companions who themselves are
reasonably suspicious?
C. Prior Knowledge of the Person. Does he have an arrest or conviction record, or is he otherwise known to have committed a serious offense? If so, is it for offenses similar to one that has just occurred, or
which the officer suspects is about to occur? Does the officer know of
the person's record?
D. Demeanor During a Contact. If he responded to questions during
the contact, were his answers evasive, suspicious or incriminating? Was
he excessively nervous during the contact?
E. Area of the Stop. Is the person near the area of a known offense
soon after its commission? Is the area known for criminal activity (a
high crime area)? If so, is it the kind of activity the person is thought to
have committed, be committing, or about to commit?
F. Time of Day. Is it a very late hour? Is it usual for people to be in the
area at this time? Is it the time of day during which criminal activity of
the kind suspected usually occurs?
G. Police Training and Experience. Does the person's conduct resemble the pattern or modus operandi followed in particular criminal offenses? Does the investigating officer have experience in dealing with
the particular kind of criminal activity being investigated?
H. Police Purpose. Was the officer investigating a specific crime or specific type of criminal activity? How serious is the suspected criminal activity? Might innocent people be endangered if investigative action is
not taken at once?
I. Source of Information. If the basis of the officer's reasonable suspicion is, in whole or in part, information supplied by another person,
what kind of person is the information source? Is he a criminal informant, a witness, or a victim of a crime? How reliable does the person
appear to be? Has he supplied information in the past that proved to
be reliable? Is he known to the officer? Did the officer obtain the information directly from the person? How did the person obtain his information? Was any part of the information corroborated prior to making
the stop?
Oberly, supranote 1, app. at 686-88 (quoting STOP AND FRISK MODEL RuLES, prepared
by the Project on Law Enforcement Policy and Rulemaking, College of Law, Arizona
State University).
23 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. For a reiteration of the Tery Court's specific holding, see
infra note 78 and accompanying text.
24 See id. at 22, 23.

25 See Emerson, supranote 13, at 400 (stating that applications of the Teny doctrine
represent "a radical departure from settled Fourth Amendment principles") (footnotes omitted). For an in depth analysis of those cases in which the Supreme Court
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Court has expanded the duration,2 6 the object, 27 the extent,28 and
the justification 29 of a permissible stop and frisk.3"
Recently, in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 1 the Supreme Court, consistent with its movement towards expansion of the stop and frisk
doctrine, expanded the scope of a permissible frisk.12 Specifically,
the Dickerson Court unanimously held that the Fourth Amendment
permitted an officer to seize nonthreatening contraband3 3 discovhas extended the Terry holding to reach circumstances not contemplated in Terry, see
infra notes 85-204 and accompanying text.
26 See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 688 (1985) (refusing to impose a
time limit on permissible stops). For a discussion of Sharpe,see infra notes 159-71 and
accompanying text.
27 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702, 705-06 (1983) (holding that law
enforcement authorities who suspect that luggage contains narcotics may search the
luggage at an airport and expose it to a dog sniff search based on a reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics) (footnote omitted); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (holding that police officers could stop a
vehicle and question its occupants based on reasonable suspicion that they were illegal aliens). For a discussion of Place, see infra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
28 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983) (permitting police officers to
search the passenger area of a car to uncover weapons during a Terry stop); see also
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (holding that a police officer could
order the driver of an automobile to alight from the vehicle during an investigative
stop). In Long, a police officer discovered a bag of marijuana while searching the
passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons. Id. at 1036 (citation omitted). Determining the propriety of the search, the Long Court acknowledged that Terry authorized only a limited pat down search of an individual. Id. at 1045-46 (citation omitted).
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the Terry doctrine was equally applicable to
the protective search of an area. Id. at 1049 (citation and footnote omitted). A protective search of a car was justified, the Long Court reasoned, because a roadside encounter between a policeman and a suspect could be especially hazardous. Id. at 1049
(citation and footnote omitted). For a more in depth discussion of the Long decision,
see infra notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
29 See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 233-34 (1985) (holding that police
officers may conduct a stop and frisk based on a reasonable suspicion that a suspect
was involved in a crime that had already been committed) (citations omitted); United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (holding that the reasonable suspicion
necessary to support a stop and frisk need not be based solely on the officer's observation of the individual, but instead may be based on the totality of the circumstances)
(citations omitted); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 148 (1972) (holding that
law enforcement authorities could stop and frisk a suspect based on an informant's
tip, and that an officer may conduct a full-scale search and seizure, not preceded by a
protective pat down frisk, to ensure his safety). For discussions of Williams, Cortez, and
Hensley, see infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text, 106-18 and accompanying text,
and 146-58 and accompanying text, respectively.
30 Cox et al., supra note 8, at 647-48 (citations and footnotes omitted).
31 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
32 Id. at 2136. The Dickerson Court considered whether the Fourth Amendment
permitted an officer to seize contraband detected during a warrantless protective
weapons search. Id. at 2133.
33 Contraband is defined as "any property which is unlawful to produce or possess.
Things and objects outlawed and subject to forfeiture and destruction upon seizure."
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ered during a protective frisk.3 4 The Court qualified its holding,
however, by warning that such a seizure is constitutional only if it is
truly the result of a lawfully executed protective frisk. 5
On November 9, 1989, Officers Vernon D. Rose and Bruce S.
Johnson were patrolling an area on the north side of Minneapolis,
Minnesota in a marked police car.3 6 At approximately 8:15 p.m.,
Officer Rose observed Timothy Dickerson exiting a nearby apartment building which Rose knew was a crack house. 37 According to
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 332 (6th ed. 1990). "Contraband per se" is defined as "prop-

erty the mere possession of which is unlawful." Id. Conversely, "derivative contraband" is "property innocent by itself but used in perpetration of [an] unlawful act." Id.
34 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2136. In reaching this conclusion, the Court analogized
the case at bar to the "plain view" doctrine set forth in Coolidge v. New Hampshireand
Arizona v. Hicks. Id. at 2137 (citations and footnote omitted). Specifically, Justice
White noted that just as the seizure of an item left in plain view does not constitute an
invasion of a legitimate privacy interest, the seizure of an immediately identifiable
object detected by sense of touch similarly would not invade a suspect's privacy. Id. at
2137 (footnote omitted). In effect, commentators have suggested, the Court's holding established a "plain touch" or "plain feel" corollary to the "plain view" doctrine.
See George E. Dix, Stop and Frisk Using a 'PlainFeel' Test, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993, at
37; Donald A. Dripps, Supreme Court Trims Fourth Amendment with 'PlainFeel'Exception,
TRAL, Sept. 1993, at 77, 78; William W. Greenhalgh &Jennifer A. DeMarrais, Criminal
Law in a State of flux, 134 N.J. L.J. 1473, 1475 (1993); The U.S. Supreme Court 1992-93
Term, 53 CRiM. L. REP. 3105, 3105 (1993) [hereinafter 1992-93 Term]; Review of Supreme
Court's Term, 62 U.S.L.W. 3125, 3135 (1993) [hereinafter Review]. For a further discussion of the DickersonCourt's use of the "plain feel" doctrine, see infranotes 182-84 and
accompanying text.
35 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2136. The boundaries of a lawfully executed pat down
search were drawn in Terry. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). A lawful pat down
search is one which is conducted for the sole purpose of disarming a suspect. Terry,
392 U.S. at 29. The minimum standard of evidence justifying a Tery frisk is reasonable suspicion, and the scope of the protective search is limited to the extent necessary for the discovery of weapons. Id. at 30. While the Dickerson Court acknowledged
that an officer might lawfully seize nonthreatening contraband detected by touch during a lawful Terry frisk, the Court found that the officer in the instant case exceeded
the bounds marked by Terry. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139. Therefore, the Court concluded, the Fourth Amendment proscribed the seizure. Id. (citation omitted).
36 State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462, 463-64 (Minn. App. 1991), affd, 481 N.W.2d
840 (Minn.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 53 (1992), affd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993). The
officers were patrolling block One Thousand of Morgan Avenue North. Id.
37 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2133. Officer Rose was a 14-year veteran with the Minneapolis Police Department. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d at 464. During his tenure with the
department, Rose had executed approximately 75 drug search warrants and participated in 50 to 75 drug-related arrests. Id. In addition, Officer Rose himself had executed numerous drug search warrants in the Morgan Avenue apartment building,
finding both drugs and weapons on the premises. Id. Therefore, Rose had first-hand
knowledge that the apartment building was used for drug trafficking. Dickerson, 113 S.
Ct. at 2133. Moreover, on the night in question, Officers Rose and Johnson were
monitoring the apartment building pursuant to a complaint from a local alderman
who reported recent drug- related activities in the building. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at
842.
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Rose, Dickerson began walking towards the squad car.3 8 Upon
viewing the car and making eye contact with Officer Rose, however,
Dickerson suddenly turned and walked towards a nearby alley.3 9
Due to Dickerson's furtive actions upon exiting the crack house,
Officer Rose decided to investigate further.4 ° Consequently, the
officers stopped Dickerson in the alley, whereupon Officer Rose
frisked him.4 1 Although the search uncovered no weapons, the officer felt a small lump in Dickerson's pocket.4 2 Officer Rose
manipulated the object with his fingers, determined that it was
crack cocaine, and retrieved it from Dickerson's pocket. 43 Subsequently, Dickerson was arrested and charged with possession of a
controlled substance.4 4
Prior to trial, Dickerson moved to suppress Officer Rose's
seizure of the crack cocaine.4 5 Following an evidentiary hearing,
the Hennepin County District Court denied Dickerson's motion
and upheld the seizure of the cocaine.4 6 First, the trial court con38 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2133. Officer Rose testified that he neither recognized
Dickerson nor knew of any criminal activity committed by him. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d
at 842. Rose also testified that he did not know which apartment Dickerson had exited. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d at 464.
39 Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d at 464. At trial, Dickerson testified that he neither saw the
police car nor made eye contact with Officer Rose. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 842.
Furthermore, Dickerson testified that he had not walked toward the police car, but
rather walked directly from the apartment building to the sidewalk which led to the
alley. Id. In addition, Dickerson testified that he was in route to his friend's house
and that the alley was the quickest course. Id. Despite Dickerson's testimony, the trial
judge credited the officer's testimony and concluded that Dickerson had abruptly
changed direction upon viewing the squad car. Id.
40 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2133. Officer Rose testified that he did not suspect that
Dickerson was engaging in criminal activity before observing Dickerson's abrupt
change of direction. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d at 464. Officer Rose further testified that
he directed Officer Johnson to drive into the alley so that he could "'check [Dickerson] for weapons and contraband.'" Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 842.
41 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2133. When stopped by the officers, Dickerson neither
made elusive movements nor attempted to conceal anything. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d at
464. Furthermore, there did not appear to be any bulges in Dickerson's clothing that
might have been a weapon. Id. Officer Rose testified that he searched Dickerson
because weapons had previously been seized in and around the Morgan Avenue
apartment building. Id. Rose further testified that based on his experience, drug
dealers often carried weapons. Id.
42 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2133.
43 Id. Officer Rose testified: "'[A]s I pat-searched the front of his body, I felt a
lump, a small lump, in the front pocket. I examined it with my fingers and it slid and
it felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane.'" Id. (quotation omitted). Dickerson's pocket contained .20 grams of crack cocaine in a knotted plastic bag. Dickerson,
481 N.W.2d at 843.
44 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134.
45 Id.
46 Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 842.
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cluded that Officers Rose andJohnson were justified under Tery v.
Ohio4 7 both in stopping Dickerson to investigate his suspicious be48
havior and in frisking Dickerson to ensure that he was not armed.
Second, analogizing the immediate facts to the "plain view" doctrine,4 9 the court concluded that Officer Rose's seizure of the crack
cocaine was valid under the Fourth Amendment. 0 Subsequently,
Dickerson proceeded to trial and was convicted.51
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. 2 As a
preliminary matter, the appellate court accepted the trial court's
47 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry held that the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to
stop and frisk an individual who the officer suspects is involved in criminal activity. Id.
at 30. Timothy Dickerson's evasive conduct caused Officers Rose andJohnson to reasonably suspect Dickerson of criminal activity. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2133. Therefore, the trial court found that the officers were justified in conducting a stop and
frisk. Id. at 2134.
48 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134. The trial court concluded that Dickerson's departure from a notorious crack house, coupled with his subsequent furtive action, provided Officers Rose and Johnson with the reasonable suspicion necessary under Terry.
Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d at 464.
49 The United States Supreme Court recognized the "plain view" doctrine in Coolidge v. New Hampshire. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plurality opinion). Under the plain view doctrine, police officers may make a warrantless
seizure of contraband that is found in plain view during a lawful search for other
items. Id. at 466. For the seizure to be valid, however, the officer must lawfully be in a
position to view the item, the discovery of the item must be inadvertent, and the
item's incriminating character must be immediately apparent. Id. For further analysis of the "plain view" doctrine, see supra note 10.
The Supreme Court later modified the prerequisites for a plain view seizure. See
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 141 (1990) (eliminating the "inadvertency" requirement of the plain view doctrine); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987)
(stating that an officer may not seize an item in plain view unless he has probable
cause to believe that the item is contraband); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 731
(1983) (stating that the "immediately apparent" prong of the plain view doctrine does
not require that the incriminating character of the item be known with certainty, but
rather that the seizing officer have probable cause to link the item to criminal activity). For further discussion of Horton, Hicks, and Brown, see supra note 10.
50 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134. Concluding that the plain view doctrine justified
Officer Rose's seizure of the cocaine, the district court stated:
"To this Court there is no distinction as to which sensory perception the
officer uses to conclude that the material is contraband. An experienced officer may rely upon his sense of smell in DWI stops or in recognizing the smell of burning marijuana in an automobile. The sound of
a shotgun being racked would clearly support certain reactions by an
officer. The sense of touch, grounded in experience and training, is as
reliable as perceptions drawn from other senses. 'Plain feel,' therefore,
is no different than plain view and will equally support the seizure
here."
Id. (quotation omitted).

51 Id.
52 State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462, 467 (Minn. App. 1991), affd, 481 N.W.2d
840 (Minn.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 53 (1992), aftd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
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conclusion that the officers were justified in stopping Dickerson
and in subjecting him to a protective pat down search.5" Finding
that the scope of the protective pat down exceeded constitutional
parameters, however, the appellate court found the subsequent
seizure to be invalid.5 4 Specifically, the court reasoned that Officer
Rose was not justified in continuing his search once he ascertained
that Dickerson was unarmed.5 5 Consequently, the court concluded
that the scope of the search rendered the seizure invalid.5 6 Moreover, the court refused to adopt the trial court's "plain feel" analogy.5 7 The court ruled, therefore, that the cocaine recovered
during the search was inadmissible at trial.58
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed.5 9 Like the court of
appeals, the supreme court held that both the stop and the subsequent pat down search of Dickerson were valid under Terry.6 ° The
court also invalidated the seizure on grounds that the scope of the
search exceeded constitutional limits.6 1 Similarly rejecting a "plain
53 Id. at 465. Assessing the validity of the stop, the court noted that it must evaluate the officer's suspicion that crime was afoot according to the common understanding of those versed in law enforcement. Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, the
court recognized that a police officer may draw inferences based on the immediate
circumstances, including his unique knowledge and experience as an officer. Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, the court concluded, Officers Rose and Johnson were
justified in finding reasonable suspicion to stop Dickerson. Id. Evaluating the legitimacy of the frisk, the court reasoned that Officer Rose was justified in searching Dickerson because Rose himself had previously recovered weapons from suspects stopped
at the Morgan Avenue apartments. Id.
54 Id. at 465, 466. The Minnesota Court of Appeals used Terry as a guidepost in its
analysis. Id. at 465-66 (citation omitted). The Terry Court noted that a protective frisk
is valid under the Fourth Amendment only if its scope is limited to the discovery of
weapons. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26.
55 Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d at 466.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 466. The court of appeals believed that the analysis in the instant case
should focus on the limited purpose of a protective pat down search. Id. at 467.
58 Id. The court relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Terry that a search which
is constitutional at its inception may nonetheless violate the Fourth Amendment "by
virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope." Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 18).
59 State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Minn.), cert. granted, 113 S.Ct. 53
(1992), affd, 113 S.Ct. 2130 (1993).
60 Id. at 843. The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of both the
trial court and the court of appeals, holding that Officer Rose had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Dickerson was engaged in criminal activity. Id. In addition,
the court agreed that Rose's suspicion that Dickerson was armed justified the protective pat down search. Id.
61 Id. Recognizing that the trial court's factual determinations deserved great deference, the supreme court nevertheless noted that this deference was not unlimited,
and that errors of both fact and law necessitated the trial court's reversal. Id. Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that Officer Rose's pat down search violated the
Fourth Amendment because the search clearly exceeded the permissible boundaries
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feel" corollary to the plain view doctrine,6 2 the court concluded
that the sense of touch is neither as immediate nor as reliable as
the sense of sight.63 In addition, the court reasoned, physically
touching someone is a far more intrusive invasion of the Fourth
Amendment right to personal privacy than simply visually observing something.'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 6 to determine whether the Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of
nonthreatening contraband detected through an officer's sense of
touch during a protective weapons search.6 6 Although the Court
ultimately concluded that Officer Rose's seizure of the crack cocaine was invalid, the Court held that under limited circumstances
an officer may seize nonthreatening contraband detected through
his sense of touch.6 7 For such a seizure to be valid, the Court clarified, it must follow the execution of a lawful Terry frisk limited to
the discovery of weapons. 68 In addition, the Court warned, the incriminating character of the contraband must be immediately apparent to the searching officer.6 9
set forth in Terry. Id. In sum, the court concluded that an officer who feels an object
that cannot possibly pose a threat to him is not justified in further manipulating the
object to ascertain its identity. Id. at 846.
62 Id. at 845.
63

Id.

Id. To illustrate the point, the supreme court distinguished an officer who views
a bag of marijuana in a suspect's pocket from an officer who discovers the bag by
manipulating it inside a suspect's pocket. Id. The court concluded that the observation of an object in plain view does not constitute a search, while the tactile discovery
of an object can be nothing but a search. Id. (citation omitted).
In so doing, the court effectively adopted a categorical rule barring the seizure of
contraband discovered by the sense of touch during a protective weapons search. See
id. Refusing to recognize the trial court's "plain feel" theory, the court distinguished
the instant case from those where an officer seizes an item that may be a weapon. Id.
In other words, the court reasoned, an officer might be justified in seizing nonthreatening contraband where the nonthreatening nature of the contraband is not
known until it has in fact been seized. Id. Finding it unreasonable that Officer Rose
might have suspected the bag of cocaine to be a threatening object, the court determined that Rose was not justified in seizing it. Id.
65 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 53 (1992), aftd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
66 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134.
67 Id. at 2137, 2139 (footnote and citation omitted).
68 Id. at 2136.
69 Id. at 2137. In reaching its conclusion, the Court referred to its holding in Michigan v. Long. Id. at 2136 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)). In Long,
the Supreme Court held that Terryjustified the seizure of nonthreatening contraband
discovered during a protective weapons search of a suspect's automobile. Long, 463
U.S. at 1050 (citations omitted). The Long Court sanctioned only those seizures, however, which result from searches that are confined to those areas in which a weapon
could conceivably be found. Id. Justifying its conclusion, the Court referred to its
holdings under the plain view doctrine. Id. at 1050 (citations omitted). The Dickerson
64
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The Supreme Court first recognized an officer's right to stop
and frisk in the landmark decision of Terry v. Ohio.70 In Terry, a
Court concluded, therefore, that the seizure of nonthreatening contraband discovered by touch during a pat down frisk is valid so long as the scope of the search is
limited to the discovery of weapons, and the incriminating character of the contraband is immediately apparent. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
70 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Although the Supreme Court first established the law of
stop and frisk in Terry, the Terry Court built upon its foundation set forth in Camarav.
Municipal Court. Id. at 20-21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35
(1967)). Camara concerned the validity of a warrantless housing inspection. Camara,
387 U.S. at 525. Specifically, Camara was charged with violating the San Francisco
Housing Code for refusing to allow a warrantless inspection of his ground-floor
quarters after city housing inspectors repeatedly tried to secure his consent. Id. at
525-26, 527. Camara's residential use of those quarters allegedly violated the building's occupancy permit. Id. at 526. In determining the propriety of such an entry,
the CamaraCourt engaged in a novel balancing test, weighing the need for the search
against the nature of the intrusion. Id. at 536-37. Although the Court ultimately concluded that Camara had a right to insist on a warrant, the Court recognized the reasonableness of a warrantless search where the governmental need outweighs the
resulting intrusion upon personal privacy. Id. at 539, 540.
The Teny Court applied the Camarabalancing test to establish that an officer may
stop and frisk a suspect without a warrant and based on evidence falling short of
probable cause where the officer suspects that crime is afoot and that the suspect is
armed and dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21, 22, 30, In so doing, the Terry Court
realized that the need of law enforcement officers to protect themselves in the field
outweighs the minimal intrusion resulting from a stop and frisk. Id. at 24, 26. Therefore, the balancing test enunciated in Camarawas the seed that ultimately germinated
into the law of stop and frisk established in Terry. See Cox et al., supra note 8, at 652
(noting that the CamaraCourt's decision opened the door to Terry's "reasonable suspicion" standard). For a more in depth discussion of the Camara decision, see
LAFAvE, A TRPATISE, supra note 1, § 9.1(d), at 343 (noting that the Camara Court
adopted a lesser standard of probable cause with regard to inspection warrants partly
because the inspections involve limited invasions of personal privacy); PoLyvIou,
supra note 1, at 221-59 (providing a general analysis of the Camara and Terry decisions); Benner, supra note 4, at 836 (stating that the Court's balancing test is a methodological device that has afforded the Court an opportunity to gradually supplant
the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment); LaFave,
Nine Key Decisions, supra note 1, at 1744 (noting that the Camara/ Terry balancing test
authorizes limited intrusions which serve compelling public needs); Scott E. Sundby,
A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72
MINN. L. REv. 383, 385 (1988) (stating that both the Camara and Terry Courts turned
to a liberal reasonableness standard and a poorly-defined balancing test to answer
novel Fourth Amendment questions); Hausknecht, supra note 1, 289-90 (examining
the Camara Court's test for establishing new exceptions to the warrant requirement);
Esther J. Windmueller, Note, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion-The Demise of Terry v.
Ohio and IndividualizedSuspicion, 25 U. RiCH. L. REv. 543, 544 (1991) (noting that the
Supreme Court first tampered with the strict probable cause requirement in Camara).
On the same day as Terry, the Supreme Court elaborated on the implications of
its new rule in two companion cases. Fernand N. Dutile, Freezing the Status Quo in
Criminal Investigations: The Melting of Probable Cause and Warrant Requirements, 21 B.C.
L. REv. 851, 861 (1980). First, in Sibron v. New York, a police officer observed Sibron, a
drug suspect, conversing with several persons known to be addicts. Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 45 (1968). The officer approached the suspect stating, "You know
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Cleveland detective, Martin McFadden, observed two men as they
repeatedly passed in front of a store, each time pausing briefly to
stare into the storefront window. 7 1 Suspecting that the men were
planning a robbery, McFadden approached them and asked for
identification. 72 The men mumbled inaudible responses, whereupon McFadden grabbed one man, Terry, and frisked him for
what I am after." Id. at 45. After the suspect mumbled something, the officer reached
inside the suspect's pocket and retrieved several glassine envelopes of heroin. Id.
Noting that the officer lacked probable cause to justify an arrest and incidental
search, the Court turned to the Terry decision. Id. at 62-63 (citation omitted). Ultimately concluding that the immediate facts did not justify a protective search, the
Sibron Court emphasized three prerequisites to the Terry frisk. Id. at 62, 64, 65. First,
the Court explained, the frisking officer must be able to articulate particular facts
from which one could reasonably infer that a suspect was armed and dangerous. Id.
at 64 (citation omitted). Second, the Court noted, the officer's intent in conducting
the frisk must be limited to the discovery of weapons. Id. at 65. Third, the majority
cautioned, the scope of a protective frisk must be limited to the extent necessary to
discover weapons. Id. In other words, the Court concluded, where an officer immediately puts his hands inside a suspect's clothing before conducting a frisk of the
outside of the garments, the intrusion is a search, not a frisk, and can be justified only
by probable cause. Id. Because the Sibron Court found that the officer did not reasonably suspect that Sibron was armed, did not execute the protective search for the
purpose of finding weapons, and did not restrict his intrusion to a limited exploration
of Sibron's outer garments, the Court held that the search was invalid under Terry. Id.
at 64, 65-66. For an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Sibron, see COOK,
supra note 1, § 2:3, at 49-50; KLOTTER & KANovrz, supra note 1, § 4.16, at 234;
LAFAVE, A TREATISE, supra note 1, § 9.2(c), at 358; RIGHTS OF THE AcCUSED, supranote
1, at 171-72; VARON, supra note 1, at 82-83; Dutile, suprt, Oberly, supra note 1, at 660-

61.
In the second case, Peters v. New York, an off-duty policeman, hearing voices in the
hallway of his apartment building, looked through his peephole and saw two men
quietly tiptoeing from the alcove to the stairway. Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 48
(1968). Recognizing neither of the men as tenants of the building, and suspecting
that they were attempting a burglary, the officer entered the hallway and slammed his
door loudly. Id. at 48-49 (footnote omitted). Consequently, the two men ran down
the stairway with the officer following closely behind. Id. at 49 (footnote omitted).
The officer caught one of the men and subjected him to a pat down that revealed a
hard object in the suspect's pocket. Id. Believing the object might be a knife, the
officer reached into the suspect's pocket and removed an opaque plastic envelope
which contained burglary tools. Id. The Court declared that an officer who discovers
an object which might possibly be a weapon is justified in expanding the scope of the
search to remove the object from the suspect's person. Id. at 67. For a discussion of
the Court's decision in Peters, see COOK, supra note 1, § 2:3, at 49-50; LAFAVE, A TREATISE, supra note 1, § 9.2(e), at 370; Dutile, supra, at 861-63; Oberly, supra note 1, at
661-63.
71 Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-6. Detective McFadden was patrolling a downtown beat
when he observed the two men. Id. at 5. McFadden saw the men pass in front of the
store approximately 12 times. Id. at 6. Upon the completion of each pass, the men
conferred on a nearby street corner. Id. After a short time, the two men were joined
by a third person, who left swiftly. Id.
72 Id. at 6-7. At the time of McFadden's approach, the two men had rejoined the
third man and were quietly conferring on a street corner. Id. at 6.
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weapons. 7 ' During the frisk, McFadden detected a revolver in
Terry's inner coat pocket.7 4 McFadden then ordered the men into
a nearby store, where he removed Terry's coat and retrieved the
revolver. 75 Subsequently, Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon.7 6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the trial court's admission of Terry's weapon violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. 77 Validating McFadden's search, the Court
held that an officer who reasonably suspects that crime is afoot and
that the suspect is armed and dangerous is entitled to conduct a
protective frisk of the suspect's outer garments. 7 The Court qualified its holding, however, by delineating the limited circumstances
under which such a search would be valid. 79 First, Chief Justice
Warren provided, the officer must be able to indicate particular
73 Id. at 7.
74 Id.
75 Id. McFadden

also frisked the other two men, seizing a revolver from one of
them. Id. McFadden did not put his hands under either man's garments until he felt
a weapon. Id.
76 Id. at 7-8. Terry's companion, Chilton, was also charged with and convicted of
the same offense. Id. at 7.
77 Id. at 8 (citation omitted).
78 Id. at 30. Writing for the Teny Court, Chief Justice Warren specifically held:
[W] here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves
to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled
for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Id. In so holding, the Court recognized that an officer's need to protect himself in
the field often outweighs the right to personal privacy. Id. at 27 (citations omitted).
Specifically, the Court noted that police officers need flexibility to respond to the
swiftly unfolding and dangerous situations encountered on city streets. Id. at 10. The
Court illustrated its rationale by noting that an officer might often be justified in
stopping an individual despite lack of probable cause to arrest. Id. at 26. For this
purpose, the Court asserted that it should distinguish between a stop and frisk on the
one hand, and an arrest and search on the other. Id. (footnote omitted). Moreover,
the Court explained, a perfectly warranted apprehension of danger might arise well
before the officer possesses adequate information to justify an arrest and incidental
full-scale search. Id. at 26-27.
In addition, the Court recognized the societal interest in detecting and preventing criminal activity. Id. at 22. Before assessing the propriety of McFadden's frisk, the
Court established that a stop and frisk, although less intrusive than an arrest and
search, nonetheless qualified as a search and a seizure, falling under the purview of
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 16, 19.
79 Id. at 21-22 (footnotes omitted). Chief Justice Warren expressly stated that
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and articulable facts which justify a reasonable suspicion that crime
is afoot and that the suspect is armed."' Second, the Court opined,
the officer's objective in conducting a frisk must be limited to the
discovery of weapons.8 ' Third, Chief Justice Warren warned, the
scope of the frisk must be confined to the extent necessary to discover those weapons.8 2 Finding that Officer McFadden's conduct
conformed with these guidelines, Chief Justice Warren upheld the
constitutionality
of the stop and frisk under the Fourth
83
Amendment.
nothing in the opinion should be construed as indicating approval of an officer's
conduct outside of the legitimate investigative sphere. Id. at 15.
80 Id. at 21 (footnote omitted). Chief Justice Warren stated that the officer must
be capable of pointing to specific, articulable facts which, coupled with rational inferences drawn from those facts, reasonably justify the intrusion. Id. (footnote omitted).
The Justice clarified this prerequisite by stating that the facts must be judged according to an objective standard. Id. at 21-22 (citations omitted). Specifically, the Court
asserted that the dispositive question to determine whether a stop or frisk was reasonable is whether the information available at the time in question would "'warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate." Id.
(citations omitted). In ascertaining the reasonableness of an officer's beliefs, the
Court stated, weight should be given to the officer's practical experience in the field.
Id. at 27 (citation omitted). To emphasize its point, the Court warned that it is not
enough that the officer have a subjective good faith belief that the intrusion was warranted. Id. (citation omitted).
81 Id. at 29. The Court noted that the sole justification for a lawful frisk is the
protection of law enforcement officers and others nearby. Id. Conversely, the Court
pointed out, an officer may not conduct a search solely for the purpose of recovering
contraband. Id. (citation omitted).
82 Id. at 26. The Court recognized that a search "which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and
scope." Id. at 17-18 (citations omitted). Clarifying this limitation, the Peters Court
explained that an officer is authorized to conduct only a cursory pat down of a suspect's outer clothing, feeling for hard objects that might be weapons. Peters v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1968) (citation omitted). Should the officer feel such an object
during the course of the frisk, the Court stated, he then has probable cause to reach
inside the suspect's garment to remove the object. Id. Therefore, as a general test,
the Terry Court recognized a dual inquiry for determining the reasonableness of a
particular stop or frisk: whether the officer's conduct was lawful at its inception, and,
in addition, whether its scope was rationally related to the circumstances which warranted the intrusion in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.
83 Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-31. The Court reiterated that McFadden had reasonable
suspicion to stop Terry and his companions, and that a reasonably prudent individual
would have been justified in believing that the men were armed. Id. at 30. Because
the stop and subsequent frisk were valid, the Court concluded, the seized weapons
could be properly admitted into evidence. Id. at 31.
Terry is a widely celebrated decision, receiving extensive attention from legal
scholars and law students alike. See Dutile, supra note 70, at 856-86 (tracing Terry's
contribution to the evolution of the "freezing the status quo" concept in the Supreme
Court); Robert B. Harper, Has the Pennsylvania Superior CourtMisreadTerry &Adams?,
20 DuQ. L. REv. 585, 611 (1982) (arguing that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
should reverse its lower courts' decisions which have eroded citizens' Fourth Amend-
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Notwithstanding the Terry Court's attempt to limit application
of the stop and frisk doctrine to the ambit of facts which gave rise
to its birth, 4 the Court began expanding upon the law of stop and
frisk in Adams v. Williams.8 5 In Williams, the Supreme Court considered whether an informant's tip could serve as ajustifiable basis for
an officer's reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot.8 6 While patrolling a high-crime area in Bridgeport, Connecticut, an individual known to Police Sergeant John Connolly approached him and
informed him that a man in a nearby vehicle had a firearm at his
ment rights); Matthew Lippman, Stop and Frisk: The Triumph of Law Enforcement Over
PrivateRights, 24 CRIM. L. BuLL. 24, 46-47 (1988) (contending that Terry and its progeny have abrogated individual privacy rights); Sundby, supra note 70, at 447 (suggesting that the Terry Court's balancing test is unworkable); Gregory H. Williams, The
Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The Gradualbut Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio,
34 How. L.J. 567, 576-88 (1991) (exploring the Court's abandonment of the principles set forth in Terry); Cox et al., supra note 8, at 647 (considering the impact of
recent Supreme Court decisions, including Terry, on the long-standing probable
cause requirement for warrantless searches and seizures); Kenneth M. Dorros, Note,
Stop and Frisk in New York: Fleeing Suspects and Anonymous Tips, 12 FoRDHAm Uius. L.J.

383, 385-90 (1984) (examining the Court's proliferation of inharmonious stop and
frisk rulings following the Terry decision); Charles W. Elliott, Note, An Anomaly in the
Reasonable Suspicion Doctrine: Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 51 COL. L. REv. 289 (1980)
(comparing the Supreme Court decision in Pennsylvania v. Mimms with that in Terry,
and concluding that Mimms, which allows an officer to order an individual out of his
car without probable cause, was an aberration in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence);
Emerson, supra note 13, at 400 (examining the constitutionality of seizing airport
luggage based on less than probable cause under the Terry balancing test); Patricia 0.
Kahn, Comment, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 139 (1985) (examining the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Placeand other extensions of the Terry decision); Thomas S.
Kiriakos, Comment, Fourth Amendment Rights of PersonsPresent When a Search Warrantis
Executed: Ybarra v. Illinois, 66 IowA L. REv. 453 (1981) (comparing the Supreme
Court's ruling in Ybarra v. Illinois to that in Terry, and concluding that Ybarra failed to
address whether articulable suspicion of an individual arises because of that individual's mere presence in a specific group or at a particular location); John M. Schohl,
Note, Airport Seizures of Luggage Without Probable Cause: Are They "Reasonable"?, 6 DuKE
L.J. 1089 (1982) (discussing the applicability of Terry principles to airport luggage
seizures) ;Jeanne C. Serocke, Note, The Automatic CompanionRule: An AppropriateStandard to Justify the Terry Frisk of an Arrestee's Companion?, 56 FoRDHAm L. REv. 917, 919,
925 (1988) (concluding that the "automatic companion rule", which allows an officer
to conduct a pat down search of "all companions of the arrestee within the immediate
vicinity[,]" constitutes an impermissible extension of Terry's exception to the probable
cause requirement) (quoting United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir.
1971)); Windmueller, supra note 70 (discussing the Supreme Court's corruption of
the narrow stop and frisk doctrine set forth in Terry).
84 See Cox et al., supra note 8, at 655 (noting that the Terry Court attempted to
restrict application of the stop and frisk doctrine to that case's factual circumstances);
see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 (stating that the Court's opinion is not to be construed as
indicating approval of any police conduct beyond the realm of the investigative stop).
85 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972) (concluding that an informant's tip could serve as
an officer's reasonable suspicion required to conduct a Terry stop).
86 Id.
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waist and was carrying narcotics. 87 Pursuing the tip, Connolly approached the vehicle and directed Robert Williams, the occupant,
to open the door.88 When Williams lowered the window instead,
Connolly reached inside the auto and removed a loaded gun from
Williams's waistband.8 9 Williams was subsequently convicted in the
state court for illegal possession of a firearm discovered during the
stop and frisk.9"
Rejecting Williams's contention that the requisite reasonable
suspicion for a lawful stop and frisk must derive from an officer's
own observations,9 1 the Court asserted that an informant's tip
87

Id. at 144-45.

88 Id. at 145.

89 Id. Although Connolly could not see the weapon from outside the car, the gun
was in the exact location indicated by the informant. Id. At that point, Connolly
placed Williams under arrest. Id. Later, other officers conducted a thorough search
of the vehicle and discovered a machete, a second revolver, and substantial quantities
of heroin. Id.
90 Id. at 144. Williams was also charged and convicted of illegal possession of heroin. Id.
91 Id. at 147. Williams contended that the seizure of the pistol from his waistband,
which ultimately led to his arrest and the search incidental thereto, could not be
justified by an informant's tip. Id. at 145. Specifically, Williams argued that Sergeant
Connolly's actions were unreasonable under Tery in the absence of corroboration of
the tip or confirmation by a more reliable informant. Id. Following the district
court's denial of Williams's petition for habeas relief, the court of appeals reversed,
holding that the evidence used to convict Williams had been unlawfully obtained. Id.
at 144 (citations omitted).
Habeas corpus is defined as "[t]he name given to a variety of writs... having for
their object to bring a party before the court orjudge." BLACK'S Law DictIoNARy 709
(6th ed. 1990). The primary function of the writ of habeas corpus is to release an
individual from unlawful imprisonment. Id. The issue presented by the writ is
whether the imprisoned individual has been deprived of his liberty by due process,
not whether the individual is in fact innocent. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, a habeas
proceeding is an independent proceeding in which the goal is to determine whether
the individual's conviction was lawfully obtained. Id. Initially, the writ afforded the
individual an opportunity to challenge a state conviction only on grounds that the
court lacked jurisdiction. Id. The scope of the inquiry, however, has been expanded,
and an individual employing the writ is now permitted to challenge his conviction on
any constitutional ground. Id. (citation omitted). A number of Supreme Court decisions have established the permissible grounds for habeas corpus. See, e.g. Herrera v.
Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 856-57 (1993) (holding that a single claim of actual innocence,
based on newly discovered evidence, does not present a cognizable issue for habeas
review); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989) (holding that changes in constitutional law will only be applied retrospectively on habeas review of cases in a strictly
limited number of circumstances); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (holding that district courts are to dismiss all habeas petitions if state remedies have not been exhausted); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-13 (1963) (holding that in a habeas corpus review, a federal court must hold an evidentiary hearing
on an issue where the petitioner was not afforded a full and fair hearing on that issue
in state court) (footnote omitted); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 231 (1924) (holding that on a second or successive habeas corpus petitions, a court could give control-
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could provide the requisite justification for a stop and frisk.9 2 The
Supreme Court held that the informant's tip carried sufficient indicia of reliability to support the resulting stop and frisk because the
informant had provided information to the arresting officer in the
past and the current information was instantly verifiable at the
scene.

93

In 1977, Pennsylvania v. Mimn&4 provided yet another indication of the Supreme Court's desire to liberalize the stop and frisk
doctrine.9 5 The Mimms Court addressed whether an officer, during
a lawful Terry stop of an automobile, 96 may order the driver from
his vehicle.9 7 While on routine traffic patrol, two Philadelphia police officers stopped Harry Mimms to issue him a summons for operating a vehicle with an expired license plate. 8 After ordering
ling weight to that court's prior refusal to discharge a similar application) (citations
omitted).
92 Williams, 407 U.S. at 147.
93 Id. at 146. Noting that in the present case the informant had supplied information to Sergeant Connolly in the past, the Court distinguished such a situation from
those in which an officer merely receives an anonymous telephone tip. Id. Additionally, the Court likened the instant situation to those in which the victim of a recent
crime furnish the police with a description of his assailant. Id. at 147. In such a case,
the Court reasoned, the subtleties inherent in the hearsay rule should not operate to
thwart appropriate police action. Id. Applying the above reasoning to the immediate
facts, the Court concluded that Sergeant Connolly had ample cause to question his
safety. Id. at 147-48 (footnote omitted). Specifically, the Court noted that the incident occurred in a high-crime area in the middle of the night. Id. at 147. In addition,
the Court explained, when Williams lowered his window rather than following Connolly's instruction to step out of the vehicle, the weapon allegedly at Williams's waistband became a greater threat. Id. at 148. Moreover, the Court determined that the
informant's credibility was heightened when Connolly discovered the weapon precisely where the informant had indicated. Id. At that point, the Court concluded,
Connolly had probable cause to arrest Williams. Id. For more on Williams, see COOK,
supra note 1, § 2:3, at 54-56; HALL, supra note 1, § 15:5, at 611; LAFAVE, A TREATISE,
supra note 1, § 9.2(c), at 358-59; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED, supra note 1, at 182-85;
RINGEL, supra note 1, § 13.1 (c), at 13-6 to -7; Dutile, supra note 70, at 866-69; Harper,
supra note 83; Mitchell Lampson, On the Silver Anniversary ofTerry v. Ohio: The Reasonableness of an Automobile Fisk, 28 CaiM. L. BuLL. 336, 339-40 (1992); Lippman, supra
note 83, at 30-32; Oberly, supra note 1, at 664-67; Williams, supra note 83, at 576-78;
Williamson, supra note 1, at 803-04; Windmueller, supra note 70, at 549-50.
94 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
95 Peggy A. Stone, Orders to Alight: Opening the Door to a New Traffic Stop Search and
Seizure Rule, 15 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 171, 172 (1981).
96 Absent a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle has
violated the law, an officer may not lawfully stop a vehicle and detain its driver to
check the driver's license or registration. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663
(1979).
97 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109. The Court framed the question as whether the order to
alight from the vehicle, issued after the vehicle's driver was justly detained, was reasonable and, therefore, lawful under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
98 Id. at 107.
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Mimms to alight from his vehicle and present identification, one of
the officers noticed a large bulge beneath Mimms'sjacket. 9 9 Consequently, the officer subjected Mimms to a pat down search that
revealed a loaded thirty-eight caliber revolver. l0 0 Mimms was subsequently convicted of possessing a concealed lethal weapon and
illegally carrying a revolver without a license. 0 1
The Mimms Court held that the search was reasonable under
Terry and, therefore, permissible under the Fourth Amendment. l° '
First, the Court reasoned, the officer had a legitimate interest in
securing his own safety.1 0 Second, the Court proffered, any intrusion into Mimms's liberty resulting from the order to exit the vehicle was, at most, de minimis. 1°4 Therefore, the Court concluded,
the suspect's interests are subordinate to those of the state and its
police officers.1 0 5
The Supreme Court further relaxed the restraints of the Terry
99 Id.

Id. The revolver contained five rounds of ammunition. Id. In addition,
Mimms's passenger was holding a .32 caliber revolver. Id.
101 Id. Prior to reaching the Supreme Court on certiorari, the case was appealed to
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which ultimately reversed Mimms's conviction.
Id. While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not question the validity of the stop
itself, it held that the officer's order that Mimms alight from his vehicle was an impermissible search. Id. at 107-08. The court so held because the officer was unable to
point to observable facts justifying a suspicion that crime was afoot or that his safety
was at risk. Id. at 108 (footnote omitted).
102 Id. at 107-08 (footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court began its
analysis by reiterating that reasonableness is the touchstone of Fourth Amendment
analysis, and hinges upon the balance between one's right to personal privacy and the
public interest. Id. at 108-09 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
103 Id. at 110. The Court found the state's interest in the safety of its police officers
to be legitimate and substantial. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the Court placed
great emphasis on a 1963 study which revealed that roughly 30% of police shootings
took place when an officer confronted a suspect seated in a vehicle. Id. (quotation
omitted). Moreover, the Court recognized the appreciable danger facing a police
officer who stands beside a suspect's vehicle as traffic passes. Id. at 111. For this
reason, the Court asserted, it is understandable that an officer may prefer that the
suspect accompany him to the safe harbor of a nearby sidewalk. Id.
104 Id. The Court balanced the government's interest in protecting an officer's
safety against Mimms's countervailing interest in protecting intrusions of his personal
liberty. Id. (footnote omitted).
105 Id. (footnote omitted). The Court concluded that the additional intrusion occasioned by the order to alight amounted to nothing more than an inconvenience,
which could not prevail when measured against legitimate interests in the officer's
safety. Id. (footnote omitted). For further insight into the Supreme Court's holding
in Mimms, see HALL, supra note 1, § 15:5, at 612; KLOTrER & KANOVITZ, supra note 1,
§ 4.16, at 236-37; RINGEL, supra note 1, § 13.5(d), at 13-59 to -60; Dutile, supra note 70,
at 874-75; Lampson, supra note 93, at 340-41; Elliott, supra note 83; Kahn, supra note
83, at 147-48; Stone, supra note 95, at 172-76.
100
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doctrine in United States v. Cortez." 6 The Cortez Court considered
whether circumstantial evidence and objective facts that a specific
vehicle was involved in criminal activity could provide the reasonable suspicion needed to justify an investigative stop of that vehicle. 10 7 In Cortez, border patrol officers suspected that an individual
was routinely transporting aliens over the Mexican border into Arizona at specific times and locations.1 0 After developing a detailed
106 449 U.S. 411 (1981). Prior to Cortez, but after Mimms, the Supreme Court decided Ybarra v. Illinois. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). The Ybarra Court held
that, absent individualized suspicion, police officers executing a premises search warrant may not stop and frisk persons found on those premises. Id. at 94.
In Ybarra, police officers obtained a warrant to search the bartender and the
premises of the Aurora Tap Tavern for narcotics. Id. at 88. When the officers entered
the tavern, located in Aurora, Illinois, they proceeded to pat down each of the tavern's patrons, ostensibly for weapons. Id. While frisking Ventura Ybarra, a customer
standing near a pinball machine, one of the officers felt a cigarette pack containing
unidentified objects in Ybarra's pocket. Id. The officer then proceeded to search
other patrons, but eventually returned to Ybarra to frisk him a second time. Id. at 8889. This time, the officer retrieved the pack of cigarettes from Ybarra's pocket and
found that it contained six tinfoil packets of heroin. Id. at 89. Consequently, an Illinois grand jury indicted Ybarra for illegal possession of a controlled substance. Id.
Ybarra's pretrial motion to suppress was denied, and he was subsequently convicted
for possession of heroin. Id.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that absent reasonable suspicion that
Ybarra was engaged in criminal activity and was armed and dangerous, the officer was
not justified in searching Ybarra. Id. at 92-93 (footnote and citations omitted). Accordingly, because the state was unable to articulate any facts that would have warranted an officer at the scene to suspect that Ybarra was armed and dangerous, the
Court invalidated the search of Ybarra. Id. at 93. In so doing, the Court noted that an
individual's mere propinquity to persons independently suspected of illegal activity
does not, by itself, give rise to the probable cause necessary to search that individual.
Id. at 91 (citation omitted). In addition, the Court noted, reasonable suspicion to
frisk can only be supported by a reasonable belief that the individual is armed and
dangerous. Id. at 92-93 (footnote and citations omitted). For a more in-depth analysis of the Court's holding in Ybarra, see Kent D. Coleman, Note, 28 U. KAN. L. REv.
512 (1980); Kiriakos, supra note 83; SandraJ. Wall, Fourth Amendment-Search of an Individual Pursuant to a Warrant to Search the Premises, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 558
(1980);Jeffrey D. Winter, Comment, Ponderingthe Scope of Premises Search WarrantsAfter
Ybarra v. Illinois, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 661 (1989).
107 Cortez, 449 U.S. at 412-13.
108 Id. at 413. The Border Patrol officers were patrolling a portion of desert in
south-central Arizona when they found human footprints in the sand. Id. In time,
the officers discovered many sets of similar footprints in the same area. Id. From
these footprints, the officers deduced that groups of 8 to 20 people had repeatedly
travelled north from the Mexican border, over a well-defined path, traversing 30 miles
of terrain to reach an isolated area on Highway 86. Id.
The officers took special note of a particular set of recurring, uniquely shaped
footprints. Id. Knowing that the area was prone to illegal immigration, the officers
deduced that a certain individual was routinely escorting illegal aliens across the border. Id. The officers further concluded that the transport typically took place on
clear evenings. Id. In addition, because the set of footprints disappeared on one side
of the highway, the officers inferred that the aliens were picked up and taken away by
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profile of the suspect's movements, the officers stopped a truck
driven by Jesus Cortez and discovered six illegal aliens hiding inside the truck's camper.' 0 9 Prior to his trial for transporting illegal
aliens, Cortez moved to suppress the officers' discovery on grounds
that they did not have sufficient cause to make the stop.11 0 The
trial court denied the motion, and Cortez was subsequently
convicted. 1 '
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that an officer may
consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether
there is adequate cause to make an investigative stop."12 While aca vehicle. Id. at 413-14. Furthermore, due to the apparent size of the group, the
officers deduced that the vehicle was likely a van, truck, or bus. Id. at 415.
109 Id. at 414-16. One evening in January 1977, the officers positioned themselves
so as to observe vehicles passing over the suspected area of Highway 86. Id. at 414.
Some time later that evening, the officers spotted a truck with a camper cover. Id. at
415. Suspecting that it might be the one used to transport the aliens, the officers
stopped the vehicle. Id. The officers' suspicions were further aroused when they
matched the shoes worn by the truck's passenger, Pedro Hernandez-Leora, with the
distinctively shaped footprint. Id. After identifying themselves, the officers informed
the driver, Jesus Cortez, that they were executing an immigration check. Id. When
asked whether there were any passengers in the truck's camper, Cortez informed the
officers that he had picked up several hitchhikers. Id. 415-16. Cortez then opened
the camper, where the officers discovered six illegal aliens. Id. at 416.
110 Id. Cortez and Hernandez-Leora were each charged with six counts of violating
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) for the transportation of illegal aliens. Id.
111 Id. Cortez and Hernandez-Leora were sentenced to concurrent five-year prison
terms for each of the six counts. Id. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the trial court's convictions on the grounds that Officers Gray and
Evans lacked sufficient cause to stop the truck. Id. (citation omitted). In reaching its
conclusion, the court of appeals relied on the Supreme Court's holding in United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce. Id. (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975)). In Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court held that border patrol officers may
only stop a vehicle if specific and articulable facts, coupled with rational inferences
drawn from those facts, reasonably justify suspicion that the vehicle contains illegal
aliens. Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. at 884 (footnote omitted).
112 Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18 (citations omitted). The Court noted that an officer's
analysis of the situation is not limited to immediately observable facts. Id. at 418. But
see Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (declining to consider circumstances
other than those which were immediately observable in determining that an officer
lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop).
In Reid, a DEA agent observed two men carrying shoulder bags while proceeding
through the Atlanta airport concourse. Id. at 439. Although separated by a group of
people, the leading man repeatedly looked back toward the second man. Id. When
the men exited the airport together, the agent approached them and asked for their
identification and airline tickets. Id. Learning that the men had only stayed in Fort
Lauderdale for one day, the agent requested that the men reenter the terminal and
consent to both a search of their bags and persons. Id. Although initially complying,
one of the men, Reid, began to flee as he entered the terminal, abandoning his shoulder bag that was later found to contain cocaine. Id.
The Georgia Superior Court granted Reid's motion to suppress on grounds that
the agent did not have an articulable suspicion that Reid was engaged in criminal
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knowledging that a Teny stop must be supported by an objective
manifestation that criminal activity is afoot, the Court recognized
that the investigating officer may consider past experience and circumstantial evidence to determine whether a stop is warranted.1 1
The Court then clarified its holding by outlining the criteria necessary for a stop to be justified." 4 First, the Court noted, the officer
must consider all known circumstances, and is entitled to make inferences and deductions deriving from his unique training and experience." 5 In addition, the Court asserted, the trial court must
weigh the evidence thereby collected according to the common
understanding of those versed in law enforcement. 16 Second, the
Court explained, the totality of the circumstances must give rise to
a suspicion that the suspect is engaged in wrongdoing." 7 Determining that the border patrol officers satisfied the requisite criteria, the Court upheld the stop." 8
Two years later, the Court took a monumental step toward expanding the Terry doctrine in United States v. Place."' In Place, the
government urged the Court to extend the principles enunciated
in Terry to encompass the seizure of personalty.120 Place arose after
law enforcement officers stopped Raymond Place in the Miami Inactivity. Id. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the seizure was
permissible under Teny because Reid fit the profile of a drug courier. Id. at 439-40
(citations omitted). On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held, as a matter
of law, that the agent could not have reasonably suspected Reid of carrying narcotics
on the basis of the observed circumstances. Id. at 441.
113 Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18 (citations and footnote omitted). The Court stated
that the officer must have an objective and particularized basis in light of all of the
circumstances for suspecting the detained person of criminal activity. Id. (citations
omitted).
114 Id. at 418.
115 Id. The Court recognized that the officer's inferences and deductions might
very well elude the untrained eye. Id.
116 Id. The Court instructed that, rather than weighing the collected evidence in
terms of a scholarly library. analysis, a reviewing court shall consider the common
understanding of trained officers. Id.
117 Id. The Court acknowledged that the central instruction of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence mandates that police conduct be grounded in specific facts. Id. (quotation and citations omitted).
118 Id. at 421-22. The Court explained that the facts and clues available to the officers built upon each other, affording a sound basis for the inferences and deductions that caused the officers to focus on Cortez's vehicle. Id. at 419. For further
review of the Cortez decision, see CooK, supra note 1, § 2:3, at 53-54; HALL, supra note
1, § 15:5, at 614-15; Dorros, supra note 83, at 388.
119 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
120 Id. at 702. Specifically, the government asked the Court to extend Tery to validate the warrantless seizure of luggage reasonably suspected of containing narcotics.
Id. The sole purpose of the seizure was to conduct a limited investigation, short of
opening the bags, to dispel or confirm the authorities' suspicion quickly. Id.

1994]

NOTE

2289

ternational Airport on suspicion of drug trafficking.1 2 ' Because
Place's flight was about to depart, the officers chose not to search
his luggage, but instead alerted Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) authorities in New York of his impending arrival.' 22 Consequently, DEA agents confronted Place upon his arrival at LaGuardia Airport and asked to search his luggage.1 21 When Place denied
their request, the agents seized his luggage and transported it to
Kennedy Airport where, ninety minutes later, a trained narcoticsdetection dog indicated that one of the bags contained narcotics.' 24 The agents subsequently secured a warrant to search the
suitcase that was later found to contain large quantities of cocaine. 125 Prior to trial, Place moved to suppress the cocaine, claiming that the seizure of his luggage was unlawful. 126 The court
denied Place's motion and convicted him after he pleaded
27
guilty.'

121 Id. at 698. Raymond Place's nervous behavior while waiting in line to purchase
his ticket aroused the officers' suspicion. Id. Consequently, the officers stopped Place
as he proceeded to his flight's departure gate. Id. Upon request, Place provided his
identification and airline ticket, and consented to a search of his checked luggage. Id.
122 Id. Although Place had already checked bags when the officers asked for his
consent to search, the agents were able to check the address tags. Id. This inspection
revealed that each bag was marked with a different address. Id. Further investigation
revealed that the addresses did not exist, and that the telephone number, which Place
had provided the airline, belonged to yet another address on the same street. Id.
123 Id. at 698-99. When Place arrived at LaGuardia airport, the New York agents
observed that he was acting suspiciously. Id. at 698. Consequently, the agents approached Place after he claimed his bags and summoned a limousine. Id. Identifying
themselves, the agents informed Place that they suspected him of transporting narcotics. Id. at 699. After confirming that the bags he was carrying belonged to him, Place
told the agents that authorities had already searched the bags in Miami. Id. The
agents informed Place that they were advised otherwise, and asked him to provide
some identification. Id. A subsequent check on Place's driver's license revealed no
prior offenses. Id. Nevertheless, the agents asked Place to consent to a search of his
bags which he refused. Id.
124 Id. After Place refused, the agents informed him that they would be taking his
luggage to a federal judge to obtain a search warrant. Id. The agents invited Place to
accompany them, but he declined. Id. Subsequently, the agents transported the bags
to Kennedy Airport and subjected them to a "sniff test." Id. During the test, the
trained narcotics detection dog responded positively to the small bag, but ambiguously to the large bag. Id.
125 Id. Because the sniff test occurred late on a Friday afternoon, the agents held
the luggage until the following Monday morning, when they finally secured a warrant
from a magistrate to search the suspected suitcase. Id. Upon opening the suitcase,
the agents found 1125 grams of cocaine. Id.
126 Id. (footnote omitted). Place was indicted for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1),
which prohibits possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Id.
127 Id. at 699-700. Denying Place's motion, the district court applied the standard
enunciated in Terry, and concluded that detention of Place's luggage was warranted if
such detention was based on a reasonable suspicion that the suitcases contained narcotics. Id. at 700. Determining that the agents had reasonable suspicion, the district
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Disregarding longstanding precedent,' 28 the Supreme Court
held that where an officer suspects that a traveler's luggage contains narcotics, the officer may briefly seize the baggage to investigate. 129 The Court qualified its holding, however, by warning that
the duration of such a detention might render the seizure unreasonable.' 3 0 Because the Court concluded that the agents did not
pursue their investigation in a diligent manner, the Court declared
the seizure unconstitutional.'
Consistent with the evolution of a consistently and increasingly
expanding stop and frisk doctrine, the Court extended the applicacourt held that detention of Place's bags did not violate his Fourth Amendment
rights. Id. (citation omitted). Consequently, Place pleaded guilty to the charge, but
reserved the right to appeal the court's denial of his motion to suppress. Id.
128 Traditionally, the Supreme Court has regarded the seizure of personal property
to be per se unreasonable in the absence of ajudicial warrant based on probable cause
specifically describing the objects to be seized. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192,
196 (1927). Nevertheless, where law enforcement officers have probable cause to believe personal property contains contraband, but have yet to secure a warrant, the
Court has permitted seizure of the property pending the issuance of a search warrant
if the exigencies of the situation so demand. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753, 761 (1979) (noting that exigent circumstances could justify the seizure of luggage from an automobile, where police believe such luggage contained marijuana)
(citation omitted); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (noting that exigent circumstances could justify the search of a footlocker absent a warrant); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 463 (1971) (explaining that exigent
circumstances could justify taking an automobile to the police station pending a
search warrant) (footnote omitted).
129 Place, 462 U.S. at 706. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals. Id. at 710. In so holding, the Court balanced the nature of the intrusion into
one's personal privacy against the government's interests in law enforcement. Id. at
703. The Court recognized that where the intrusion is de minimis, the governmental
interests may justify a seizure based on evidence falling short of probable cause. Id.
Emphasizing the transitory nature of drug courier operations at airports, the Court
concluded that the government's interest in preventing criminal activity justified investigative stops based on a reasonable suspicion of drug-trafficking. Id. at 704 (footnote omitted).
130 Id. at 709. Although declining to place a per se time limit on a permissible investigative stop, the Court nonetheless recognized that the brevity of the intrusion into
one's privacy plays an important role in determining whether the intrusion was so
minimally intrusive as to be rationalized by reasonable suspicion. Id. (footnote
omitted).
131 Id. at 709-10 (footnote and citation omitted). The PlaceCourt explained that an
officer's diligence in pursuing his investigation is one of the factors the Court will
consider in assessing the duration of the detention. Id. at 709. The Court noted that
the New York agents were informed of Place's pending arrival far enough in advance
to arrange for the sniff test at LaGuardia Airport. Id. Thus, the Court determined
that the agents could have minimized the ultimate intrusion upon Place's liberty. Id.
(footnote omitted). The Court concluded, therefore, that "[t]he length of the detention of [Place's] luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause." Id. For further insight into the Placedecision,
see generally Emerson, supra note 13; Kahn, supra note 83.
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bility of Terry to the search of automobiles in Michigan v. Long.1 1 2
The Long Court considered whether a police officer had the authority to conduct a Terry-type search of a vehicle during an investigatory stop of the vehicle's occupant.1 33 The Long issue arose after
Deputies Howell and Lewis stopped David Long for driving erratically.'3 4 The officers then met Long at the rear of his vehicle and
asked him to produce identification.1 3 5 As Long began to reenter
his automobile, presumably to retrieve his registration, the officers
observed a large hunting knife on the vehicle's floorboard. 3 6 Consequently, the officers detained Long, subjected him to a pat down,
13 7
and searched the interior of his vehicle for additional weapons.
Although Deputy Howell did not find any weapons, he noticed an
object protruding from beneath the armrest and subsequently removed a bag of marijuana. 138 Accordingly, the officers arrested
Long for possession of a controlled substance.13 9 Before trial,
Long moved to suppress the evidence, contending that Howell's
search of the vehicle was unlawful. 14' His motion denied, Long
132 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). The Long decision is often cited for the proposition that
where a state court renders a decision based on both state and federal law, and the
state court's decision is unclear as to which ground was dispositive, the Supreme
Court may presume that the state court relied on federal law, and may therefore review the decision if the Court so desires. See id. at 1040-41. The state court may avoid
this result if it expressly and clearly indicates that the decision is alternatively founded
on bona fide independent and adequate state grounds. Id. at 1041. For an analysis of
the federalism element of the Long decision, see generally Patricia Fahlbusch &
Daniel Gonzalez, Comment, Michigan v. Long: The Inadequacies of Independent and
Adequate State Grounds, 42 U. MiAivi L. Rsv. 159 (1987); David G. Newkirk, Note, The
Use of State ConstitutionalProvisions in CriminalDefense After Michigan v. Long, 65 NEB.
L. REv. 605 (1986); Felicia A. Rosenfeld, Note, Fulfillingthe Goals of Michigan v. Long:

The State Court Reaction, 56 FoRDtM

L. REv. 1041 (1988).

Long, 463 U.S. at 1037 (citation omitted).
134 Id. at 1034, 1035 (footnote omitted). Deputies Howell and Lewis were patrolling a rural area shortly after midnight when they observed David Long pull off the
main road onto a side street and, shortly thereafter, swerve into a shallow ditch. Id.
(footnote omitted).
135 Id. at 1035-36. As Long exited the vehicle to meet the officers, he left the
driver's side door open. Id. at 1036. When the officers approached Long, they repeatedly requested that he produce his driver's license and registration. Id. Finally,
Long presented his driver's license, but not his registration. Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. Following the pat down, Deputy Lewis detained Long at the rear of his vehicle while Deputy Howell shone a flashlight inside the vehicle to search for additional
weapons. Id. (quotation omitted).
138 Id.
139 Id. In addition to the marijuana found inside the vehicle's passenger compartment, a search of the entire vehicle conducted pursuant to Long's arrest revealed 75
pounds of marijuana inside the vehicle's trunk. Id.
140 Id. at 1036, 1045-46 (quotation omitted).
133
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proceeded to trial and was convicted.1 4 1
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that an officer may lawfully search a vehicle's passenger compartment if the officer reasonably believes that the vehicle's occupant is dangerous and
capable of gaining immediate control of weapons. 14 2 While acknowledging that Terry authorized only the limited pat down of a
person, the Long Court concluded that the Terry doctrine was
equally applicable to the protective search of an area.14 3 The
141 Id. at 1036. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the officer's
search of the interior of Long's vehicle was justified as a Terry protective search. Id. at
1036-37 (citation omitted). The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
sole purpose of a Terry search, protection of officers and others nearby, was not furthered by the search of Long's vehicle. Id. at 1037 (quotation omitted). The
Supreme Court also concluded that the marijuana in Long's trunk was the "fruit" of
an illegal search and, therefore, should have been suppressed. Id. (footnote
omitted).
142 Id. at 1049 (quotation and footnote omitted).
143 Id. at 1046, 1048-49 (quotations omitted). The Court specified that the searching officer must be able to articulate specific facts which, coupled with rational inferences drawn from those facts, reasonably justify the officer's belief that the vehicle's
occupant is dangerous and capable of gaining immediate control of any weapons located inside the vehicle. Id. at 1049 (quotation and footnote omitted). In so concluding, the Court pointed to several key passages of the Terry decision which left the door
open for subsequent expansion of the Terry doctrine. Id. at 1046-47 (quotations and
footnote omitted). For example, the Court noted that in Terry, ChiefJustice Warren
expressly stated that there is "'no ready test for determining reasonableness other
than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search
[orseizure] entails.'" Id. at 1046 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967))).
Applying the facts of the instant case, the Long Court stated that the officer's
need to protect himself far outweighed Long's privacy interests. Id. at 1052 (quotations and footnote omitted). The Court further asserted that it would be wholly unreasonable to deny a threatened officer the opportunity to take measures to ensure
his safety. Id. at 1047 (quotation omitted). The Court then noted that investigative
detentions involving suspects in vehicles can be particular dangerous. Id. at 1047-48
(citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972)).
In Mimms, the Court declared that an officer conducting a traffic stop not only
may order a driver from his vehicle, but also may frisk the driver for weapons on a
reasonable belief that the driver is armed and dangerous. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109110, 111-12. The Mimms decision rested in large part on the Court's recognition of
the risk of danger facing an officer who approaches a suspect seated in an automobile. Id. at 110 (citation omitted). For a detailed discussion of Mimms, see supranotes
94-105 and accompanying text.
Similarly, in Williams, the Court declared that an officer acting solely on an informant's tip may reach inside the passenger compartment of an automobile to retrieve a gun from the driver's waistband, even though the weapon was not visible to
the officer standing outside the vehicle. Williams, 407 U.S. at 144-45, 148. Again, the
Williams Court recognized the inordinate risk confronting an officer during automobile stops. Id. at 147-48 & n.3. For a detailed elaboration of Williams, see supranotes
85-93 and accompanying text.
The Long Court noted that Chief Justice Warren, in Terry, expressly stated that
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Court qualified its holding, however, by limiting the scope of a permissible search to those areas of the passenger compartment that
might harbor a weapon.1 44 Concluding that the officers acted reasonably in taking preventive measures to ensure their safety, the
1 45
Court upheld the search.
The Supreme Court added yet another dimension to the law
of stop and frisk when, in 1985, it decided United States v. Hensley.1 46
In a case of first impression, the Hensley Court considered whether
the Terry doctrine permitted an officer to stop and frisk an individual suspected of involvement in a completed felony. 147 Hensley
arose after the local police department in St. Bernard, Ohio, issued
a "wanted flyer" for Thomas Hensley, the suspect in an armed robbery.1 48 Acting pursuant to the flyer, Officers Daniel Cope and
the Teny opinion did not delineate Fourth Amendment limitations on protective
searches and seizures, but rather left the development of such limitations to the factual circumstances of subsequent cases. Long, 463 U.S. at 1047 (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. at 29). Therefore, in Chimel v. California, for example, the Court recognized that
an unarmed suspect may nonetheless pose a threat to a seizing officer by virtue of the
suspect's access to weapons. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Addressing this concern, the Chimel Court held that an arresting officer may lawfully conduct
a protective search of the area within the suspect's immediate control. Id. Moreover,
in New York v. Belton, the Court held that articles located inside the passenger compartment of a suspect's vehicle are deemed to be within the suspect's immediate control. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (quotation omitted).
144 Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 (footnote and citation omitted).
145 Id. at 1051. In so concluding, the Court recognized that although Long was not
seated in his vehicle at the time of the search, he was nonetheless capable of gaining
immediate control of any weapons inside the vehicle. Id. at 1050, 1051. For example,
the Court noted that Long could have broken away from the officers and retrieved a
weapon from the vehicle's passenger compartment. Id. (citation omitted). In addition, the Court recognized that Long would be free to reenter his vehicle if the officers did not place him under arrest. Id. at 1051-52 (citation omitted). Finally, the
Court stated, Long was actually permitted to reenter his vehicle before the conclusion
of the investigative stop, giving him an opportunity to obtain a weapon. Id. at 1052.
Finding each scenario equally plausible, the Long Court concluded that investigative
stops involve close range encounters where police officers are particularly vulnerable.
Id. (quotation omitted). In such circumstances, Justice O'Connor noted, the Court
has not required police officers to adopt alternative measures for ensuring their
safety. Id. (footnote omitted). For further discussion of the Long decision, see generally LAFAVE, A TREATISE, supra note 1, § 9.4(e), at 528-36; Baker, supra note 10; Oates,
supra note 10.
146 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
147 Id. at 223, 227. The Hensley case was one of first impression in that the Court's
previous stop and frisk decisions involved investigations of ongoing or imminent criminal activity. Id. at 227 (citations omitted).
148 Id. at 223. In December 1981, two armed individuals robbed a tavern in St.
Bernard, Ohio, a suburb of Cincinnati. Id. Six days after the robbery, Officer Kenneth Davis of the St. Bernard Police Department interviewed an informant who stated
that Hensley was the driver of the getaway car. Id. Based on this information, Davis
issued a "wanted flyer" that instructed neighboring police departments to hold Hens-
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David Rassache of the Covington Police Department apprehended
Hensley and discovered several firearms in his vehicle.1 49 Following indictment by a federal grand jury,' 50 Hensley moved to suppress the firearms, claiming that Officer Cope violated Teny when
he stopped Hensley in connection with a completed crime.1 5 ' The
district court denied Hensley's motion and convicted him after a
bench trial.1-

2

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor held that a
police officer may stop an individual whom the officer reasonably
ley for the St. Bernard Police Department should he be located. Id. In addition, the
flyer warned the neighboring departments that Hensley should be considered armed
and dangerous. Id.
149 Id. at 224-25. The Covington Police Department received the wanted flyer by
teletype on December 10, 1981. Id. at 223. On December 16, Covington Police Officer Terence Eger spotted Hensley sitting in a vehicle parked in the middle of a local
street. Id. at 223-24. Eger ordered Hensley to move on and, as Hensley drove away,
Eger radioed the station to see if there was an outstanding warrant for Hensley's
arrest. Id. at 224. Before the dispatcher responded, Covington Officers Daniel Cope
and David Rassache, who were patrolling in a separate vehicle nearby, interrupted
and informed Eger that there could be an outstanding Ohio robbery warrant on
Hensley. Id. Cope and Rassache then proceeded to search for Hensley, while the
Covington dispatcher continued to check on the existence of a warrant. Id.
Shortly thereafter, Officer Cope located Hensley in his vehicle and pulled him
over. Id. Before Cope exited his vehicle, the department dispatcher informed him
that she had not yet confirmed the warrant. Id. (quotation omitted). Cope then approached Hensley's vehicle and instructed Hensley and his passenger to exit the car.
Id. Shortly thereafter, Officer Rassache arrived at the scene and recognized the passenger to be Albert Green, a convicted felon. Id. When Rassache approached the
open door of Hensley's vehicle, he observed a revolver protruding from beneath the
passenger's seat, whereupon he arrested Green. Id. at 224-25. A search of the vehicle
revealed two more handguns, the discovery of which resulted in Hensley's arrest. Id.
at 225.
150 Hensley was indicted in the Eastern District of Kentucky as a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202 (a) (1). Id. at 225.
151 Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Teny authorized only a stop and
frisk based on a reasonable suspicion that a suspect was presently engaging in, or was
about to engage in, criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
152 HensLey, 469 U.S. at 225. The district court judge sentenced Hensley to a federal
prison term of two years. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed on the grounds that the seizing officers were not justified in stopping Hensley based on a suspicion that he was previously involved in a completed felony. Id.
(citation omitted). In reaching its conclusion, the appellate court relied on its perception of Supreme Court decisions that investigative stops are only justified when
based on a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is presently engaged in criminal
activity. Id. (quotation omitted). Because the Covington police officers encountered
Hensley nearly two weeks after the robbery in St. Bernard, the appellate court asserted that the officers had no cause to believe that they were investigating ongoing
criminal activity. Id. In addition, the appellate court noted that the Covington police
officers could not rationally conclude from the wanted flyer that an arrest warrant
had been issued for Hensley. Id.
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believes was involved in a completed felony.1 5 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court applied the Teny balancing test, weighing
the government's need to seize against the individual's right to privacy. 15 4 As in Terry and its progeny, the Hensley Court concluded
that the interests of law enforcement outweighed those of the individual.15 5 Acknowledging that the government's interest in
preventing criminal activity was not furthered by the investigation
of completed crimes, the Court nonetheless found that the government's interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice
was sufficiently compelling. 5 6 The Court tempered its holding,
153 Id. at 229. The Court asserted that an officer is similarly authorized to make
such a stop if he believes the suspect is wanted in connection with such a felony. Id.
The officer's suspicion, the Court cautioned, however, must be based on specific and
articulable facts. Id.
154 Id. at 228 (citations omitted). The Court rejected the court of appeals's conclusion that the Supreme Court's prior opinions contemplated an inflexible rule that
precluded the police from stopping suspects to investigate past crimes absent probable cause to arrest. Id. at 227. Instead, the Supreme Court asserted that its prior
decisions addressed the propriety of conducting investigative stops based on a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was engaged in previous criminal activity. Id.; see, e.g.,
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983) (stating that the Court had previously
acknowledged an officer's authority to stop an individual when the officer reasonably
suspected that the individual has been involved in criminal activity) (citation and footnote omitted); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (suggesting that certain
seizures are permissible under the Fourth Amendment where the seizing officer reasonably suspects that an individual has committed a crime); United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 417 n.2 (1981) (indicating that an officer may stop an individual if he reasonably suspects that the individual is wanted in connection with a past crime).
Against this judicial backdrop, the Hensley Court reasoned that an officer is not automatically shorn of his authority to stop a suspect merely because the officer suspects
that the individual has been involved in past criminal activity. HensLey, 469 U.S. at 228.
155 Id. at 229.
156 Id. at 228-29. The Court stated forthrightly that the factors comprising the
Court's balancing test are quite different when the stop is conducted to investigate
completed criminal activity rather than that which is ongoing. Id. at 228. For example, the Court explained, the inherent exigency in a stop to investigate and prevent
ongoing criminal activity is not necessarily present long after the crime has been completed. Id. In addition, the Court posited, the safety of the officer and those around
him is not necessarily threatened once the crime has been completed. Id. Finally, the
Court observed that officers contemplating an investigative stop after a crime has occurred have a broader range of opportunity to select the time and place of the stop.
Id. at 228-29 (citations omitted).
Notwithstanding these acknowledgements, the Court nevertheless found that the
government's concern for solving crimes and bringing perpetrators to justice justified
post-crime investigative stops based on a reasonable suspicion. Id. at 229. In so concluding, the Court reasoned that bridling police action until officers have obtained
probable cause would only hinder the investigation and invite the possibility that the
suspect would escape and remain at large. Id. The Court also noted that the privacy
intrusion occasioned by an investigative stop of a past crime is no greater than that
occasioned by an investigative stop of an ongoing crime. Id.
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15 7
however, by limiting its application to cases involving felonies.
Finding that Officer Cope reasonably suspected that Hensley was
wanted in connection with a completed felony, the Court upheld
the stop. 58
The Supreme Court further expanded the law of stop and
frisk in United States v. Sharpe.159 In Sharpe, a patrolling DEA agent
157 Id. The Court stated that the Hensley opinion did not contemplate the propriety
of conducting reasonable suspicion stops to investigate all types of past crimes. Id.
Thus, the Court specifically declined to extend its holding beyond the facts from
which it derived. Id.
158 Id. at 236. Specifically, the Court concluded that the St. Bernard police possessed a reasonable suspicion that Hensley had been involved in a robbery. Id. at 233.
The Court agreed with the district court that the information provided by the informant to the St. Bernard Police Department was sufficiently reliable to arouse reasonable
suspicion that Hensley was involved in the robbery. Id. at 233-34 (citation omitted).
Moreover, the Court asserted that the stop by the Covington Police was no more intrusive than that which the St. Bernard Police could have conducted. Id. at 236.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court referred to its holding in Adams v. Williams, which upheld an investigative stop based on an informant's tip. Id. at 234 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972)); see also Williams, 407 U.S. at 147
(rejecting Williams's argument that reasonable justification for an officer's stop and
frisk may not derive from information supplied by a third party). In Williams, the
Court concluded that an informant's tip carried sufficient indicia of reliability to give
rise to a reasonable suspicion and to justify an investigative stop. Williams, 407 U.S. at
147. For a discussion of the Williams opinion, see supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text. Using similar reasoning, the Hensley Court found that the information that
gave rise to the wanted flyer was sufficiently reliable. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 234 (quotation omitted). Concluding that Officer Cope had reasonable suspicion, the Court
proclaimed that the justification for an investigative stop did not evaporate once the
robbery was completed. Id.
Turning to the credibility of the flyer, the Court asserted that where a police
department has issued a bulletin or flyer based on articulable facts which supported a
reasonable suspicion that the person wanted is under investigation, reliance on that
bulletin or flyer justifies an investigative stop. Id. The Court then returned to the
balancing test enunciated in Terry. Id. at 236. In so doing, the Court concluded that
the law enforcement interest in allowing one police department to conduct investigative stops based on another department's flyers or bulletins is considerable, while the
intrusion upon a suspect's personal security is minimal. Id. Moreover, the Court asserted that the interests that advocate the propriety of investigative stops in connection with past crimes similarly support permitting police departments to rely on each
other's conclusions. Id. For alternative discussions of the Hensley opinion, see HALL,
supra note 1, § 15:5, at 620-22; RINGEL, supra note 1, § 13.3(b)(1), at 13-20 to -22;
Lippman, supra note 83, at 32-33; Windmueller, supra note 70, at 556.
159 470 U.S. 675 (1985). In Sharpe, the Court addressed whether a permissible Tery
stop is subject to temporal restraints. Id. at 683. Sharpe was not the first case to consider the point at which an investigative stop, which only requires reasonable suspicion, becomes an arrest, for which probable cause is required. See, e.g., Florida v
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 501 (1983); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 206-07, 212
(1979); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 722 (1969).
First, in Davis v. Mississippi, the Court held that detaining an individual for fingerprinting amounts to an arrest for which probable cause is required. Davis, 394 U.S. at
726-27, 728 (quotations, citations and footnote omitted). In Davis, police officers de-
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tained an African-American youth for fingerprinting in connection with a rape investigation. Id. at 722-23. In addition, the youth was questioned by police on several
occasions not only in his home and car but also at police headquarters. Id. at 722. At
the time of detention, the officers had neither a warrant nor probable cause to arrest.
Id. at 723. Over his objection that the prints were the product of an illegal detention,
the youth's fingerprints were later admitted into evidence at his rape trial. Id. Subsequently, the youth was convicted of rape. Id. On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court held that the length of the detention and the lack of exigent circumstances constituted an arrest for which a warrant was required. Id. at 723, 728. For
further discussion of the Davis decision, see Oberly, supra note 1, at 663-64; Williamson, supra note 1, at 804-05.
Similarly, in Dunaway v. New York, the Court held that detaining and interrogating a suspect amounts to an arrest for which probable cause is required. Dunaway,
442 U.S. at 216. In Dunaway, officers apprehended a murder suspect and took him to
a police station where he confessed to the crime during an hour-long interrogation.
Id. at 202-03 & n.2. At trial, the defendant, Dunaway, moved to suppress the confession. Id. at 203 & n.1. The trial court denied Dunaway's motion, and he was convicted. Id. at 203. On certiorari, the Court concluded Dunaway's detention was "in
important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest." Id. at 212. Therefore,
the Court determined, probable cause was required, and the lack thereof rendered
the detention and resulting confession invalid. Id. at 212-13, 219 (quotation and footnote omitted). For a closer look at Dunaway, see Dutile, supra note 70, at 875-76;
Oberly, supra note 1, at 670-72; Williamson, supra note 1, at 805-07; Emerson, supra
note 13, at 409-10.
Likewise, in Florida v. Royer, the Court held that confining a suspect to a small
area for questioning constituted an arrest, necessitating probable cause. Royer, 460
U.S. at 501, 502-03. In Royer, narcotics detectives stopped an individual in an airport
on a suspicion that he was a drug courier. Id. at 493-94. Upon request, but without
consent, Royer produced his airline ticket and driver's license. Id. at 494. When the
detectives learned that the name on the license did not match that on the ticket, they
questioned Royer with regard to the discrepancy. Id. Receiving an unsatisfactory explanation, the detectives asked Royer to follow them to a small room adjacent to the
concourse. Id. In addition, the detectives retrieved Royer's luggage from the airline
without his consent and brought it to the room. Id. Subsequently, the detectives
requested that Royer permit his luggage to be searched. Id. Although he did not
respond, Royer unlocked one suitcase, which one of the detectives then opened, and
discovered marijuana. Id. The detective then asked Royer to divulge the combination to the remaining suitcase. Id. Royer replied that he did not know the combination, but that he did not object to the detective opening the suitcase. Id. at 494-95.
The detectives subsequently pried open the suitcase and discovered more marijuana.
Id. at 495. The trial court denied Royer's motion to suppress the marijuana and convicted him of felony possession of marijuana. Id. On appeal, the Court held that the
nature of Royer's detention rendered it an arrest requiring probable cause. Id. at
501. Although the detectives had reasonable suspicion to seize and search Royer's
luggage, the Court held the search invalid and the evidence inadmissible because
searching one's luggage, a serious intrusion of personal liberty, required more than a
mere suspicion. Id. at 502. For a more in depth analysis of the Royer decision, see
HAi.±, supra note 1, § 15:5, at 616-18; LAFAVE, A TREATISE, supra note 1, § 9.2(f), at
387-90; RINGEL, supra note 1, §13.3(b) (3); Lippman, supra note 83, at 39; Cox et al.,
supra note 8, at 660-64; Windmueller, supra note 70, at 554.
Invalidating the stops in Dunaway and Royer, the Sharpe Court noted that the
Court in those cases focused, not on the duration of the stop specifically, but rather
on the nature of the detention as a whole. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 684. But see United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 699, 709 (1983) (holding that where government agents
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noticed two suspicious vehicles traveling in tandem on an area of
highway under surveillance for drug trafficking." 6 After following
the vehicles for a short time, Agent Cooke radioed the State Highway Patrol for backup."' Officer Trasher responded to the call,
joining Agent Cooke's pursuit. 6 2 Shortly thereafter, Agent Cooke
stopped the Pontiac while Officer Trasher continued in pursuit of
the pickup truck.16 Finally apprehending the second vehicle, Officer Trasher detained the driver for approximately fifteen minutes
while awaiting Agent Cooke's arrival."6 When Agent Cooke arrived, he searched the vehicle and placed both drivers under arrest
after finding several burlap bales which appeared to contain marijuana. 165 Subsequently, Cooke confirmed that the bales contained
detained an individual's luggage for 90 minutes, the duration of the detention alone
rendered the seizure invalid absent probable cause). For further discussion of Place,
see supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
160 Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 677. Specifically, while patrolling a coastal highway near Sunset Beach, North Carolina, DEA Agent Cooke observed a pickup truck with a camper
shell travelling in tandem with a Pontiac Bonneville. Id. Cooke deduced that the
truck was heavily loaded based on the truck's response to bumps in the road. Id.
Cooke's suspicions were further aroused when he observed that a cloth material covered both the rear and side windows of the truck. Id.
161 Id. Cooke followed the vehicles for 20 miles as they traveled south into South
Carolina. Id.
162 Id. Shortly after Officer Trasherjoined the procession, the pickup and the Pontiac turned off the highway onto a campground road. Id. Cooke and Trasher continued to pursue the speeding vehicles, which eventually turned back onto the highway.
id. at 677-78.
163 Id. at 678. Turning on his flashing light, Officer Trasher pulled alongside the
Pontiac and motioned the driver, Sharpe, to stop. Id. As Trasher and the Pontiac
moved into the right lane, the pickup cut between the two, nearly hitting Trasher's
patrol car, and proceeded down the highway. Id. Consequently, Agent Cooke pulled
up behind the blue Pontiac while Officer Trasher continued to pursue the pickup
truck. Id. Approaching the Pontiac, Cooke identified himself and asked Sharpe for
identification. Id. Sharpe presented a Georgia driver's license in the name of Raymond J. Pavlovich. Id. Cooke then tried to radio Officer Trasher, who did not respond. Id. Subsequently, Cooke radioed the Myrtle Beach Police Department for
assistance, and two officers answered the call. Id. When the officers arrived at the
scene, Cooke left in search of Trasher and the pickup truck. Id.
164 Id. at 678-79. Officer Trasher had stopped the pickup approximately one-half
mile down the highway. Id. at 678. Following the stop, Trasher approached the vehicle with his gun drawn, ordered the driver out of the truck, and patted him down for
weapons. Id. Finding no weapons, Trasher asked the driver, Savage, for his license
and registration. Id. Savage presented his license and the vehicle's bill of sale which
bore the name Raymond Pavlovich. Id. When Trasher inquired about the ownership
of the vehicle, Savage told him that the pickup belonged to a friend and that Savage
was taking it to have the shock absorbers repaired. Id. Informed that he would be
detained until DEA Agent Cooke arrived, Savage became nervous, expressed his desire to leave, and asked that Trasher return his driver's license. Id. at 678-79.
165 Id. at 679. Agent Cooke arrived approximately 15 minutes after Trasher had
stopped Savage's pickup. Id. Subsequently, Cooke realized that the name on the
pickup's bill of sale matched the name on the license presented by Sharpe. Id.
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marijuana, and following the trial court's refusal to suppress the
contraband, the two drivers were convicted for possession of a con166
trolled substance with intent to distribute.
The United States Supreme Court considered whether the duration of the detentions transformed them into arrests for which
probable cause was required. 6 7 Upholding the convictions, the
Court concluded that the length of the detentions had not rendered them unreasonable under the standard enunciated in
Terry.1 68 In so holding, the Court unequivocally refused to place a
time restriction on a lawful Terry stop.1 69 The proper approach in
assessing whether the duration of an investigative stop was reasonable, the Court posited, was to determine whether the officer diligently pursued his investigation to confirm or dispel his suspicions
swiftly.1 70 Concluding that Agent Cooke acted diligently, the Court
17 1
upheld the detentions and resulting convictions.
Cooke then identified himself and requested permission to search the truck. Id. Savage refused Cooke's request, stating that he did not own the truck. Id. Putting his
nose to the window of the truck's camper, Cooke smelled marijuana. Id. Consequently, Cooke took the keys from the ignition, opened the camper, and discovered
several burlap-wrapped bales which appeared to be the type typically used for transporting marijuana. Id. Accordingly, Agent Cooke arrested Savage and, returning to
the location of the Pontiac, arrested Sharpe and his passenger. Id. At the time of his
arrest, Sharpe had been detained for approximately 30 to 40 minutes. Id.
166 Id. at 679-80. Cooke later opened several of the bales, without a warrant, and
confirmed that they contained marijuana. Id. at 679. In total, the police confiscated
43 bales containing 2629 pounds of marijuana. Id. Charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (1) and 18
U.S.C. § 2, Sharpe and Savage moved to suppress the contraband. Id. at 680. The
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied the motion, and
Sharpe and Savage were convicted. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed, holding that the investigative stops were invalid because they failed to comply with the brevity requirement governing detentions based on evidence falling short
of probable cause. Id. at 680, 683 (quotation omitted). The government then petitioned for certiorari. Id.
167 Id. at 680, 683 (quotation omitted).
168 Id. at 686, 688. The Court recognized that where an individual is detained indefinitely, there comes a point at which the detention becomes an arrest. Id. at 685.
The Court explained, however, that prior decisions in similar cases had not imposed
rigid time limits on the duration of a permissible investigative stop. Id. (quotation
omitted).
169 Id. The Court maintained: "We reject the contention that a 20-minute stop is
unreasonable when the police have acted diligently and a suspect's actions contribute
to the added delay about which he complains." Id. at 688.
170 Id. at 686 (citations omitted). The Court cautioned that, when reviewing an
officer's diligence, a court should consider whether the officer was acting in a rapidly
developing situation, and if so, should not indulge in hindsight or unrealistic secondguessing of the officer's actions. Id. The Court further stated that the dispositive
question is not whether there was an available alternative to the officer's course of
action, but whether the officer acted unreasonably in failing to pursue it. Id. at 687.
171 Id. at 687-88 (footnote and citation omitted). The Sharpe Court concluded that
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Against this backdrop ofjudicial precedent arose the Supreme
Court's disposition of Minnesota v. Dickerson.172 The Dickerson Court
granted certiorari 173 to resolve a conflict among the lower courts as
to whether an officer may seize contraband discovered during a
protective pat down search. 174 Writing for the majority, 171 Justice
the instant case did not involve any unnecessary delay, and that neither officer was
dilatory in his investigation. Id. at 687. In fact, the Court noted, any delay which did
occur was solely attributable to the evasive movements of Savage, who sought to elude
the officers as Sharpe moved his vehicle to the roadside. Id. at 687-88 (footnote omitted). For further analysis of the Court's decision in Sharpe, see Lippman, supra note
83, at 40-41.
172 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
173 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 53 (1992), affd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
174 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134. Most state and federal courts recognize a "plain
touch" or "plain feel" analogue to the "plain view" doctrine. Id. at 2134 n.1 (citations
omitted); see, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that when an officer performs a search for weapons in a car under the Terry/
Long exception, the officer may "touch" objects or even open those objects) (footnote
omitted); United States v. Salazar, 945 F.2d 47, 51 (2d. Cir. 1991) (holding that an
officer has probable cause to search a suspect for drugs when the officer, during a
frisk for weapons, feels something that his experience tells him is narcotics), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1975 (1992); United States v. Buchannon, 878 F.2d 1065, 1066, 1067
(8th Cir. 1989) (holding that an officer was justified in seizing a substance from a
suspect's pocket after determining during a protective pat down that the substance
was cocaine under a "plain feel" rationale); United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174,
1181-86 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (endorsing the "plain feel" exception where an officer opens
a container whose contents become known after conducting a permissible touching
of the outside of such container) (footnote omitted); United States v. Norman, 701
F.2d 295, 297 (4th Cir.) (holding that an officer was justified under the "plain view"
doctrine in searching bales for marijuana because, having the opportunity to smell
and feel the bales, the officer was sure of their contents), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820
(1983); People v. Chavers, 658 P.2d 96, 102 (Cal. 1983) (holding that an officer was
justified in opening a shaving kit after inadvertently feeling a handgun inside the kit);
State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311, 317-18 (Wis. 1992) (holding that an officer lawfully
seized a bag from a suspect's pocket during a frisk after surmising by sense of touch
that the bag contained narcotics).
Conversely, several state courts have refused to recognize the so-called "plain
feel" exception. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 299 (N.Y. 1993) (rejecting
the "plain feel" exception to the warrant requirement because extending the "plain
view" rule to allow intrusions based on one's sense of touch contradicts both state and
federal constitutions); State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 101 (Wash. 1982) (asserting
that an officer was not justified in removing a soft bulge from a suspect's pocket after
having determined that the bulge was not a weapon); State v. Rhodes, 788 P.2d 1380,
1381 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (holding that during a Terry pat down, any officer may
not seize an object unless he reasonably believes such object felt like a weapon) (citations omitted); State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80, 82-83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
an officer was not justified in seizing from a suspect's pocket a soft object which the
officer believed to be narcotics and not a weapon); People v. McCarty, 296 N.E.2d
862, 863 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (holding that an officer was not permitted to remove a
soft plastic bag from a suspect's pocket once the officer determined that the object
was not a weapon); cf.Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597 A.2d 616, 622, 623 & n.17 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that probable cause to seize an object did not arise when an
officer felt what he believed to be a package of methamphetamine in a suspect's
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White set the stage for the Court's analysis by resounding the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment,1 7 6 and by reflecting upon the
Court's disposition of Terry v. Ohio.1"
pocket) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 611 A.2d 711 (1992). For an analysis of the
history and development of the "plain view" doctrine, see supra note 10.
175 Exemplifying solidarity, all nine Justices concurred in the judgment that an officer may seize nonthreatening contraband discovered by touch during a protective
Terry frisk. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2133, 2136; id. at 2141 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at
2141 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A majority of the
Court joined Justice White in concluding that Officer Rose could not benefit from the
newly minted "plain touch" exception because Rose overstepped Terry's "strictly circumscribed" protective weapons search. Id. at 2133, 2138 (citation omitted).
Justice Scalia, concurring, however, challenged the propriety of the Court's conclusions in Terry. Id. at 2139 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Specifically,
the Justice questioned whether the Terry majority had properly interpreted the Fourth
Amendment in establishing the "frisk" prong of the stop and frisk doctrine. Id.
Although unaware of any precedent in common law for conducting a search of an
individual who was not yet under arrest, Justice Scalia was willing to assume that the
Terry frisk was in harmony with the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, joined the
Court on that basis. Id. at 2140-41 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Blackmun and Thomas, agreed with
Justice White's "plain touch" analysis, but would have remanded the case to determine whether Officer Rose's frisk was in fact unlawfully executed. Id. at 2141 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176 Id. at 2135 (citations omitted). Justice White reflected that the Fourth Amendment guaranteed against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. (quotation omitted). The Justice further reiterated on the Court's conviction that searches and
seizures executed outside of the judicial arena are per se unreasonable in the absence
of some well-delineated exception. Id. (quotation and citations omitted).
177 Id. at 2135-36 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) (other citation omitted). Specifically, Justice White noted that the Terry decision established an exception
to the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement by authorizing an officer to
stop and frisk a suspect based on evidence falling short of probable cause for arrest.
Id. at 2136 (citations omitted). According to Terry, the Court explained, an officer
who reasonably suspects that an individual is engaged in criminal activity is authorized
to stop that individual to investigate, notwithstanding the absence of probable cause
for arrest. Id. at 2135 (citations omitted). The Court reaffirmed that prong of the
Terry ruling in Adams v. Williams. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972)
(citations omitted). In addition, Justice White reminded, Terry authorized the officer
to conduct a protective pat down search of the suspect if the officer reasonably believes that the individual is armed and dangerous. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2136 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). Finally,Justice White echoed certain dispositive passages of
the Terry decision, in which Chief Justice Warren qualified the Court's holding by
limiting both the purpose and scope of a permissible Terry frisk to the detection of
weapons. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 26) (other citations omitted).
Specifically, the Dickerson Court noted that the sole purpose of a lawful Terry frisk
is to allow a seizing officer to pursue his investigation free from fear of harm. Id.
(quoting Williams, 407 U.S. at 146). Accordingly, the Court warned, the scope of a
permissible Terry frisk must be limited to that which is necessary to dispel the officer's
fear of harm. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 26) (other citations omitted). In conclusion, the Court asserted, if the scope of a protective search exceeds that which is
necessary for the discovery of weapons, the search becomes invalid under Terry, and
the fruits of that search will be suppressed. Id. (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
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After laying this foundation, Justice White then launched his
178
analysis by recounting the Court's holding in Michigan v. Long.
In Long, the Justice reminded, the Court upheld an officer's
seizure of nonthreatening contraband which the officer discovered
during a protective automobile search. 17 9 The Long Courtjustified
its conclusions, Justice White recalled, by reference to the Court's
decisions under the "plain view" doctrine. 180 Under the "plain
view" doctrine, the Justice explained, an officer conducting a
search of premises pursuant to a warrant may seize contraband not
specified in the warrant so long as it comes within the officer's
plain view and its incriminating character is instantly apparent."8
Building upon the Long holding, Justice White maintained
that the "plain view" doctrine was similarly applicable to situations
in which an officer, during his execution of a Terry frisk, discovered
nonthreatening contraband through his sense of touch.8 2 The
propriety of drawing such an analogy, Justice White asserted, derived from the realization that the same pragmatic considerations
40, 65-66 (1968)). For an in depth discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in
Terry, see supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
178 Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2136 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049,
1050 (1983)) (other citations omitted). For a lengthy discussion of the Longcase, see
supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
179 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2136 (quotation and citations omitted). The Long Court
upheld an officer's seizure of marijuana discovered in plain view while searching a
suspect's automobile for weapons. Long, 463 U.S. at 1036, 1046, 1049. The Long decision first addressed the propriety of a protective weapons search of an automobile. Id.
at 1049. The Long Court held that an officer may search a suspect and his automobile
for weapons during a roadside encounter if the officer reasonably believes that the
suspect is armed and dangerous. Id. The Long Court qualified this holding by limiting the scope of the search to those areas of the passenger compartment which could
conceivably hold a weapon. Id. The Long opinion next considered the propriety of
permitting an officer to seize nonthreatening contraband discovered while executing
a search for weapons. Id. at 1050 (citations omitted). The Long Court held that such
a seizure was proper where the contraband was in the officer's plain view. Id. (citations omitted).
180 Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2136 (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 1050); United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985)). The "plain view" doctrine permits an officer to
execute a warrantless seizure of an item if the officer is in a lawful position from
which to view the item, the item's incriminating character is immediately apparent
and, finally, the officer has a lawful right of access to the item. Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990) (citations and footnote omitted).
181 Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2136-37 (citations omitted). According to a recent formulation of the "plain view" doctrine, the incriminating character of contraband is
"immediately apparent" if the frisking officer has probable cause to believe that the
item in his plain view is associated with criminal activity. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 741-42 (1983) (citations and footnote omitted). The "immediately apparent requirement," the Court continued, does not require the belief to be correct "or more
likely true than false." Id.
182 Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2137.

NOTE

1994]

2303

view" setting are equally applicable to the
that inhere in the "plain
"plain feel" seizure."' 3 Specifically, the Court recognized that
where an officer, from a lawful vantage point, either observes or
feels contraband, the officer's subsequent seizure of that contraband does not occasion a further intrusion into the possessor's
privacy.'

84

Following the Court's enunciation of the "plain touch" hypothesis, the majority proceeded to disavow the grounds upon
which the Minnesota Supreme Court had rejected the "plain
touch" analogy. 18 5 First, Justice White spurned the supreme
court's perception that the sense of touch is intrinsically less immediate and less reliable than the sense of sight."8 6 According to Jus183 Id. (footnote omitted). The seizure of contraband which results from an officer's tactile discovery during a Terry frisk was later termed a "plain feel" or a "plain
touch" seizure. See RINGEL, supra note 1, § 13.9, at 13-70 (stating that Dickerson enunciated a new "plain feel" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement);
Dix, supra note 34, at 37 (referring to Dickerson's "plain feel" seizure during an otherwise proper search for weapons); Greenhalgh & DeMarrais, supra note 34, at 23 (stating that because the boundaries of Dickerson's newly-created "plain feel" exception are
ill-defined, its future impact is unclear); 1992-93 Term, supra note 34, at 3105 (referring to the Dickerson "plain touch" exception); Review, supra note 34, at 3135 (calling
Dickerson's "plain touch" exception "[t]he case with the greatest potential for law enforcement purpose").
184 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137-38 (citations omitted). The Court explained that
the rationale behind the "plain view" seizure is that an individual's privacy is not invaded, and a Fourth Amendment search does not occur when an officer seizes an
item which the individual has placed in plain view. Id. at 2137 (citing Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983)). Alternatively, Justice White noted, even if the invasion into the individual's privacy is
considered a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, it is not a search independent
from the initial invasion that gave rise to the officer's lawful vantage point. Id. (citations omitted). In either instance, the Court reasoned, the warrantless seizure of the
contraband is justified by the recognition that resort to a magistrate would often be
impracticable and ineffective in promoting Fourth Amendment objectives. Id. (citing
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 467-68 (1971)). Similarly, the Court noted, an officer's seizure of contraband,
tactually discovered during a Terry frisk, does not invade a suspect's privacy beyond
the authorized weapons search, so long as the contraband's incriminating character is
immediately apparent. Id.
185 Id. at 2137-38. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that, although Officer Rose
was justified in conducting a stop and frisk of Timothy Dickerson, Rose's seizure of
the crack cocaine was unconstitutional. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 846
(Minn.), cert. granted, 113 S.Ct. 53 (1992), affd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993). Affirming the
court of appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly refused to adopt the "plain
feel" analogy on grounds that the sense of touch is inherently less immediate, less
accurate, and more intrusive into personal privacy than the sense of sight. Id. at 845.
For a discussion of the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision, see supra notes 59-64
and accompanying text.
186 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137. The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the
Dickerson facts lent support to its general perception that one's sense of touch was
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tice White, the Terry decision itself demonstrated that one's sense
of touch is sufficiently reliable to support a seizure.1 87 The Justice
further explained that the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement provided an adequate safeguard to ensure against ex1 88
cessively speculative seizures.
Second, the majority rebuffed the Minnesota Supreme Court's
contention that the sense of touch is more intrusive into one's personal privacy than the sense of sight. 189 While the Court acknowledged that the sanctity, of an individual's privacy interest might
otherwise be a valid concern, Justice White professed that such a
concern is inapposite in the context of a Terry search where the
intrusion has already been sanctioned by the lawful frisk for weapons.1 9 Accordingly, the Court concluded that an individual's privacy interests are not fostered by an absolute rule barring the
inaccurate. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 844, 845. While the trial court concluded that
Officer Rose was immediately aware that the lump in Dickerson's pocket was crack
cocaine, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the trial court's findings in this regard. Id. at 844. In support of its conclusion, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted
that Officer Rose conceded that he recognized the cocaine only after feeling and
manipulating the lump with his fingers. Id. That testimony, the supreme court reasoned, belied any notion that Officer Rose was immediately aware of the contraband's
incriminating character. Id. In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that
Officer Rose testified that he had directed his partner, Officer Johnson, to follow
Dickerson into the alley so that he could search Dickerson for weapons and drugs. Id..
187 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137. Justice White proclaimed that the Court's holding
in Terry derived from the premise that an officer could ascertain, through his sense of
touch, whether a suspect was armed with weapons by conducting a protective pat
down of the suspect's outer garments. Id.
188 Id. (footnote omitted). Specifically, the Court noted that the probable cause
requirement of the Fourth Amendment provides a blanket safeguard to protect
against unreasonably conjectural seizures, whether derived from the sense of sight or
the sense of touch. Id. Therefore, the majority stated, even if the sense of touch was
less reliable than the sense of sight, that would merely suggest that an officer would
less frequently be able to justify a seizure of unseen contraband. Id.
189 Id. at 2137-38. The Minnesota Supreme Court found this proposition to be the
strongest argument in support of rejecting the "plain feel" rule. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d
at 845. To illustrate, the court drew a distinction between observing contraband in a
suspect's pocket, and manipulating the suspect's pocket to ascertain its contents. Id.
(emphasis added). According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, the former is not a
search, while the latter cannot be characterized as anything other than a search. Id.
190 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137, 2138. The Dickerson Court contended that an officer's seizure of an item, the identity of which is already clear to the officer, does not
occasion a further invasion into the suspect's privacy. Id. (citing Soldal v. Cook
County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 545-46 (1992); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 141 (1990);
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 (1984)).
In Horton v. California, the Court upheld an officer's "plain view" seizure of contraband not specified in the warrant to search Horton's premises. Horton, 496 U.S. at
142. Although the magistrate had authorized only the seizure of robbery proceeds
from Horton's home, Justice Stevens, relying on the Court's precedent under the
"plain view" doctrine, held that the police lawfully seized weapons from Horton's
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seizure of nonthreatening contraband plainly detected through an
officer's sense of touch. 19 1
Having resolved the pertinent legal issues, Justice White began
synthesizing law and fact. 19 2 The dispositive question before the
Court, the majority asserted, was whether Officer Rose acted within
the lawful parameters marked by Tery when he gained probable
cause to conclude that the mass in Dickerson's pocket was crack
cocaine. 193 After a close examination of the record, the Dickerson
Court determined that Officer Rose clearly overstepped the
1 94
boundaries of Terry's "strictly circumscribed" weapons search.
Specifically, Justice White proclaimed, Officer Rose's continued exploration of Dickerson's pocket after ensuring that the pocket conhome that were in plain view during the officers' search for robbery proceeds. Id. at
130-31, 142. For a discussion of the Horton holding, see supra note 10.
Likewise, in United States v. Jacobsen, the Court held that a DEA agent who
searched and seized a closed container of narcotics was justified because a private
party had already searched the container and informed the agent of the container's
contents. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111, 126. In so holding,Justice Stevens stated that "the
federal agents did not infringe any constitutionally protected privacy interest that had
not already been frustrated as the result of the private conduct." Id. at 126.
191 Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. at 2138.
192

Id.

Id. The Court noted that Dickerson had not challenged the trial court's findings, affirmed by both the court of appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court, that
Officers Rose and Johnson were justified in stopping and frisking him for weapons.
Id. Therefore, the Court declared, the sole question remaining was whether Officer
Rose exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry frisk which would render that frisk
violative of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
194 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)). Justice White noted that the
district court had not made precise findings with regard to the scope of Rose's frisk,
but instead concluded that Rose, "after feeling 'a small, hard object wrapped in
plastic'" in Dickerson's pocket, "'formed the opinion that the object... was crack...
cocaine.'" Id. (quotation omitted). Justice White further remarked that both the district court and the appellate court had concluded that Rose never suspected the lump
in Dickerson's pocket to be a weapon. Id. (quotations omitted). Similarly, Justice
White noted, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Officer Rose's own testimony
"'belies any notion that he "immediately"'" recognized the lump in Dickerson's
pocket to be cocaine. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844
(Minn. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S.Ct. 53 (1992), affd on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 2130
(1993)).
Conversely, the majority acknowledged, the Minnesota Supreme Court found
that Officer Rose determined that the lump was cocaine only after "'squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket,'" a pocket
which Rose already knew did not contain a weapon. Id. (quoting Dickerson, 481
N.W.2d at 844). Justice White explained that where a police officer, during the
course of an otherwise valid search for one object, in fact seized another, the
Supreme Court had been "'sensitive to the danger . . . that officers will enlarge a
specific authorization, furnished by a warrant or an exigency, into the equivalent of a
general warrant to rummage and seize at will.'" Id. (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 748 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
193
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tained no weapon amounted to the type of evidentiary search that
Terry and its progeny have staunchly prohibited.'9 5
After declaring Officer Rose's search invalid under Terry, Justice White returned to the Court's newly minted "plain feel" doctrine. 19 6 Once again, the Justice maintained, the Court's analogy
to the "plain view" doctrine in the context of a Terry stop was warranted. 19 7 To demonstrate, Justice White referred to Arizona v.
Hicks,198 a recent "plain view" seizure case. 9 9 In Hicks, the majority
noted, the Court invalidated the seizure of stolen stereo components where the seizing officers gained probable cause to surmise
that the equipment was stolen only after expanding the scope of
their search by moving the equipment to view its serial numbers.20 0
In short, Justice White remarked, the Hicks seizure could not be
sustained under the "plain view" doctrine because the incriminating nature of the components was not immediately apparent." 1
Similarly, Justice White explained, although Officer Rose was
justly in a position to detect the lump in Dickerson's pocket, Rose
determined that the lump was contraband only after extending his
195 Id. at 2138-39 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 26; Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1049 n.14 (1983); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968)). Justice White acknowledged that the sole justification for a Terry frisk is the safety of officers and
others nearby. Id. at 2139 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 29). Therefore, the Court
stressed, the sole purpose of a Terry frisk is the discovery of weapons. Id. at 2138-39
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 29).
196 Id. at 2139.
197 Id.
198 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
199 Id. In Hicks, police officers entered an apartment in search of an individual who
had reportedly fired a bullet through the apartment's floor, injuring a tenant below.
Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323. During the course of their search for the gunman and any
firearms in the apartment, the officers observed two sets of costly stereo equipment
that seemed misplaced in the squalid and dilapidated four-room apartment. Id. Suspecting that the stereo equipment might be stolen, the officers moved some of the
components to read and record their serial numbers. Id. Confirming that the equipment was stolen, the officers seized the property. Id. Consequently, Hicks, the tenant
of the apartment, was indicted for robbery. Id. at 324.
200 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139. Although concluding that the police were lawfully
in Hicks's apartment, the Hicks Court held that the seizure was invalid under the
"plain view" doctrine because the serial numbers were not immediately observable.
Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325, 328 (citation omitted).
201 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139. In setting forth the prerequisites for a "plain view"
seizure, the Supreme Court has mandated that the incriminating character of the
property seized be immediately apparent. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 466 (1971) (stating that it must be "immediately apparent" to the officer that he
has evidence before him). In subsequent "plain view" seizure cases, the Court has
held that an officer satisfies the "immediately apparent" prong of the Coolidge analysis
by demonstrating that he had probable cause upon his first observation to believe that
an item was contraband. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 142 (1990); Hicks, 480
U.S. at 326; Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42 (1983) (quotation omitted).
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search beyond the confines outlined in Terry.20 2 This further exploration of Dickerson's pocket, the Court concluded, rendered
both the search and the subsequent seizure constitutionally invalid.20 3 While the Court's innovative "plain touch" doctrine could
not vindicate Officer Rose, Justice White nevertheless held that the
Fourth Amendment authorizes the seizure of contraband detected
during a Terry frisk, so long as the scope of the frisk is limited to
that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons.20 4
Concurring, Justice Scalia questioned the constitutionality of
searching persons not yet under arrest. 2 ° 1 While conceding that
the Court had sanctioned such a procedure in Terry, Justice Scalia
chided the Teny Court for failing to ensure that compliance with
traditional standards was met.2 0 6 In short, Justice Scalia conceived
of no common law precedent for searching persons not yet under
arrest, and expressed doubt as to whether the ratifiers of the
Fourth Amendment would have endorsed such action on evidence
falling short of probable cause.20 7 Justice Scalia noted, however,
202 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139. Thus, the Court observed, the incriminating character of the crack cocaine inside Dickerson's pocket was not immediately apparent.
Id.
203 Id. (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 140).
204 Id. at 2136.
205 Id. at 2140 (Scalia, J., concurring).
206 Id. at 2139 (ScaliaJ., concurring). Justice Scalia stressed his conviction that the
fundamental tenet of constitutional adjudication is that constitutional terms "must be
accorded the meaning ascribed to them at the time of their ratification." Id. at 2139
(ScaliaJ., concurring). Therefore, the Justice posited, the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures must be construed in light of
what the Framers deemed unreasonable when the amendment was adopted. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Justice Scalia further asserted that the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment was to preserve the degree of respect for one's personal privacy
that existed at the time of ratification. Id. This purpose does not change, the Justice
exclaimed, merely because a less virtuous age becomes less demanding with regard to
rights of individual autonomy. Id. Therefore, Justice Scalia charged that the Tery
Court, in accordance with its liberal style, merely adjudged that a frisk was reasonable
by contemporary estimations. Id. (citation omitted).
207 Id. at 2140 (ScaliaJ., concurring). Justice Scalia did not question the propriety
of conducting an investigative stop of suspicious persons, and acknowledged that such
practice had roots in common law jurisprudence. Id. (citations omitted). Moreover,
the Justice conceded that on probable cause, an investigative stop often escalates into
an arrest, at which point the common law would license not only a frisk, but also a
full-scale search. Id. Justice Scalia concluded, however, that where an investigative
detention did not rise to a custodial arrest, and where the officer lacked the probable
cause necessary to support such an arrest, the common law did not support conducting a physical search of the detainee. Id. (citations omitted). In addition, Justice
Scalia doubted that "the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment
would have allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and
dangerous, to such indignity .... " Id.
The Justice then described the Tery frisk as it has been detailed in police manu-
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that Dickerson did not challenge the constitutionality of the
frisk.20° The Justice therefore concluded that, assuming that the
frisk was constitutional, the Court was correct in proclaiming that
any evidence lawfully discovered incidental to that frisk would be
admissible.

20 9

Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justices Blackmun and
Thomas joined, concurred in part and dissented in part.2 10 The
partial dissenters agreed with Justice White's framing of the dispositive issues2 11 and "plain touch" discussion, but would have remanded the case for a closer look as to whether Officer Rose's frisk
of Timothy Dickerson actually exceeded the limits of Terry.212 Specifically, the Justices were concerned with determining the point at
which Officer Rose gained probable cause to conclude that Dickerson's pocket contained cocaine, an issue on which the district
court had not made precise findings.2 1 3
als. Id. (quotation omitted). For a description on how to conduct a proper Terry frisk,
see supra note 21. The Justice next suggested that even if the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment would have considered a weapons frisk impermissible in 1791, when the
amendment was drafted, perhaps it would have been considered acceptable by 1868,

when the Fourteenth Amendment made the Fouith Amendment applicable to the
states. Id. Alternatively, Justice Scalia ventured that a frisk might have become permissible only in the recent past due to modern advances in weapons technology. Id.
Even so, the Justice asserted, the Terry Court advanced none of the foregoing justifications for curtailing Fourth Amendment liberty interests. Id. at 2140-41 (Scalia, J., concurring). For this reason, the Justice proffered, Terry's mode of analysis was flawed.
Id. at 2141 (Scalia, J., concurring).
208 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2141 (Scalia, J., concurring). Although Justice Scalia did
not agree with the Terry Court's mode of analysis, he agreed with the result. Id. Justice Scalia might have voted to exclude the evidence in Terry had the Justice believed
either that the case was wrongly decided, or that good public policy required doing so
under constitutional law. Id. As a policy matter, the Justice remarked that while it
might be desirable to allow frisks for weapons, it is not desirable "to encourage 'frisks'
for drugs by admitting evidence other than weapons." Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 2141 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211 Id. Specifically, the Justices agreed that the dispositive question before the
Court was whether Officer Rose exceeded the bounds marked by Terry when he
manipulated the lump in Dickerson's pocket before having probable cause to believe
it was contraband. Id. (citation omitted).
212 Id.
213 Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that although the district court had not
made precise findings with regard to the point at which Officer Rose obtained probable cause to believe that the lump in Dickerson's pocket was cocaine, the majority
accepted the findings of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Id. The ChiefJustice further
noted that the conclusions of the Minnesota Supreme Court were imprecise and not
squarely directed to the question of Rose's probable cause. Id. Therefore, the partial
dissenters would have vacated the judgment and remanded Dickerson for further proceedings in accordance with the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment analysis. Id.
For further discussion of the Dickerson opinion, see RINGEL, supra note 1, § 13.9,
at 13-70 (outlining the Dickerson opinion); Greenhalgh & DeMarrais, supranote 34, at
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is both exceedingly intricate and highly controversial. 214 Fourth Amendment debate derives, in large part, from the longstanding tug-of-war that exists
between the competing interests of the government and its citizens. 21 5 Traditionally, critics have attacked the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment rulings on two fronts. Commentators who
champion individual privacy interests have castigated the Court for
its apparent willingness to chip away at Fourth Amendment rights
to free the hands of law enforcement.2 1 6 Conversely, critics who
23 (stating that the Dickerson Court failed to impose boundaries on the newly created
"plain feel" exception to the warrant requirement, thereby rendering its future uncertain); Dix, supra note 34, at 37, 41 (stating that the Dickersoncase will afford the Court
a much needed opportunity to limit the rights of law enforcement); Dripps, supra
note 34, at 77-78 (analyzing the Dickerson opinion and concluding that the Court's
immediately apparent requirement will make time the most important factor in future litigation); 1992-93 Term, supra note 34, at 3105-06 (outlining the Dickerson opinion); Review, supra note 34, at 3135-36 (same).
214 See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures.., has not-to put
it mildly-run smooth."); Tomkovicz, supra note 4, at 645 (noting that Fourth
Amendment adjudication has produced extensive analyses, raised complex issues, and
generated an enigmatic body of doctrine) (footnote omitted); Himstreet, supra note
10, at 195 ("The United States Supreme Court's numerous, seemingly contradictory
rulings over the years have made search and seizure one of the most complex areas of
criminal procedure."); see also Recent Case, supra note 1, at 551-52 & n.25 (explaining
that the plethora of factual circumstances which might arise under the Fourth
Amendment make search and seizure law extremely complex and ripe for frequent
litigation).
215 See LANDYNSK1, supra note 1, at 173 (stating that the Supreme Court has been
mindful of the practical demands of effective law enforcement in its search and
seizure adjudication); POLYWOU, supra note 1, at 31 (recognizing that courts have
typically balanced the impact of governmental activity on an individual's sense of security against the efficiency of the action as a law enforcement technique); ZAR.R,
supranote 1, at 24 (stating that "there is a real tension between the professed needs of
law enforcement and the liberty of the individual" in the law concerning search and
seizure); Cox et al., supra note 8, at 650 (noting that following World War II, the
Supreme Court began addressing the tension between guarding personal privacy
rights and facilitating effective law enforcement); Pizarro, supra note 10, at 367 (commenting that several recent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the struggle between an individual's right to be secure from arbitrary governmental intrusion and
the government's concern for vigorous law enforcement).
216 See LANDYN S,
supra note 1, at 87 (stating that the exceedingly numerous exceptions to Fourth Amendment proscriptions have narrowed the potential protection of
the amendment); Benner, supra note 4, at 825-26 (noting with disapproval that the
Supreme Court has eroded Fourth Amendment protections by effectively shifting
power away from the individual and granting it to the government); Lippman, supra
note 83, at 24 (noting that the "hydraulic pressures" of crime detection and prevention have spurred the Court "to water down" Fourth Amendment guarantees).
The logical antithesis to this proposition is that the
government's interest in promoting general welfare through effective law enforcement outweighs any interests in personal privacy. See Caldwell, supra note 1, at 324
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ascribe to the government's camp have chided the Court for its
failure to provide law enforcement officials with workable stop and
frisk guidelines. 1 7
The Court's recent proliferation of ill-founded and inharmonious decisions in the Fourth Amendment arena have spawned solicitude on both sides, and have necessitated the promulgation of
clear standards and workable guidelines.2 18 Minnesota v. Dickerson
(recognizing that the full panoply of police-citizen encounters should not come
within the circumscriptions of the Fourth Amendment).
217 Windmueller, supranote 70, at 543. In an insightful commentary, Windmueller
noted that although the Court has issued a plethora of investigative stop decisions,
"the Court has failed to promulgate a coherent and practical stop-and-frisk procedure
for law enforcement personnel to follow." Id. Although judges and lawyers utilize the
Court's stop and frisk standards, the author contended that the Court's ambiguity is
particularly egregious to law enforcement personnel who must apply the standards on
a daily basis. Id. at 561; see also Dutile, supranote 70, at 869 (suggesting that the Court
be forthright and candidly hold that an officer may frisk an individual when the officer reasonably suspects that the individual is in possession of a weapon or other contraband); Lampson, supra note 93, at 345, 364-65 (commenting that the present state of
Fourth Amendment search and seizure law is in disarray, and that the time has come
for the Court to draw bright lines); Lippman, supra note 83, at 24 (noting that the
Court's recent Fourth Amendment determinations effectively plant a "judicial thumb"
on the law enforcement side of the scale); Sundby, supra note 70, at 383 (remarking
that the Supreme Court has failed to provide law enforcement with a coherent framework from which to function in the field); Cox et al., supra note 8, at 680 (concluding
that the Court has engaged in confusing, unpredictable, and incremental Fourth
Amendment adjudication in an attempt to facilitate law enforcement); Recent Case,
supra note 1, at 552 (noting that the Supreme Court has not been clear with regard to
the parameters of a permissible stop and frisk).
218 See Harper, supranote 83, at 586, 611-12 (recommending that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania Legislature adopt stop and frisk guidelines "to
provide a semblance of order to this disorderly area of the law"). Harper recognized
that the Court's case-by-case interpretation of the Fourth Amendment has produced
unclear guidelines for the lower courts and law enforcement officials to follow. Id.
Harper further noted that the Court's recent onslaught of ill-defined pronouncements has led to confusion, as well as a violation of traditional Fourth Amendment
scripture. Id.; see also Lampson, supra note 93, at 345 (stating that the Court's poorly
reasoned stop and frisk decisions necessitate the drawing of bright lines); Oberly,
supra note 1, at 653-54 & app. (identifying the confusion presently confronting the
police officer who must handle stop and frisk situations, and recommending adoption
of the Stop and Frisk Model Rules, prepared by the Project on Law Enforcement
Policy and Rulemaking of the Arizona State University College of Law, to redress the
problem); Bush, supra note 4, at 1807-08 (stating that the Court's failure to adhere to
the spirit of its early search and seizure decisions constricts Fourth Amendment
rights); Cox et al., supra note 8, at 647 (remarking that the new, conservative Court
majority has attempted to convert Terry's narrow exception to the probable cause requirement into a broad license for stop and frisk); Pizarro, supra note 10, at 367 (remarking that the Supreme Court has evidenced a growing propensity to subordinate
the interests of the individual to those of the state); Prynkiewicz, supra note 10, at
1269 (speculating that the Supreme Court is headed down the road to complete evisceration of traditional Fourth Amendment protections).
Pursuant to these concerns, many critics have proposed that the Court return to
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provided neither.
Although Dickerson provided the Court with an opportunity to
return Fourth Amendment rights to the citizen, hopeful critics
were forced to turn their sights towards a new day due to Justice
White's partial vindication of Officer Rose's search of Timothy
Dickerson.21 9 While on its face the Court's ruling merely affords
police officers the power to seize contraband discovered via their
sense of touch during a lawful weapons search, close examination
the strictly circumscribed principles set forth in Terry. See, e.g., Windmueller, supra
note 70, at 563-64 (stating that the Court should reinstate the familiar, clear, and
workable principles enunciated in Terry).
219 Dix, supra note 34, at 37. In anticipation of the Dickerson holding, Dix noted
that the case would afford the Supreme Court "an excellent opportunity to impose
much-needed limits on police power .

. . ."

Id. Specifically, Dix suggested that the

Court limit a police officer's authority to stop citizens and conduct pat down searches
to what is needed to check for weapons. Id. In so doing, Dix was mindful of the
Supreme Court's warning in Terry that a stop could be made only on a reasonable
suspicion that crime was afoot, and that pat down searches could be initiated solely on
a reasonable belief that a suspect was armed and dangerous. Id. Believing that the
Dickerson record revealed not only that Officer Rose intended to search Dickerson for
both weapons and narcotics, but also that he was immediately satisfied that Dickerson
was unarmed, Dix hoped that the Court would declare the frisk unlawful. Id. at 37,
41. In sum, noting that the Fourth Amendment imposed no practical limits on a
police officer's ability to stop, frisk, and search individuals, Dix anticipated that the
Dickerson Court would remedy this. Id. at 37.
While Dix was hopeful that the Dickerson Court would address the police power
issue, he questioned whether the Court would have the courage to effectuate change.
Id. Among the remedial measures proposed, Dix suggested that the Court declare a
citizen's evasive actions insufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion that crime is
afoot. Id. at 41. Dix recognized that most courts have allowed officers to rely on a
citizen's evasive efforts to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion for a stop. Id. at
37. This approach, Dix charged, was improper, and should be so declared by the
Dickerson Court. Id.
In particular, Dix asserted that Timothy Dickerson's choice to walk a particular
route did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 41. This was so, Dix declared, even if Dickerson specifically chose to avoid
police officers. Id. Dix suggested that only conduct that is extremely evasive under
the circumstances should give rise to the reasonable suspicion required for a Terry
stop. Id. Dix further suggested that the Court use Dickerson to announce that police
officers seeking to rely on a citizen's elusive conduct as justification for a stop must
demonstrate why that conduct amounted to anything more that an individual's
choice to avoid close contact with police officers. Id.
As an additional means of limiting police power, Dix urged the Dickerson Court to
hold that reasonable suspicion alone is insufficient grounds for a Terry stop. Id. As
Terry warned, however, a pat down search is justified only by a reasonable suspicion
that the suspect is armed, and a frisk for the purpose of discovering narcotics is unlawful. Id. Instead, Dix argued that an officer must also reasonably believe that the stop
will afford him a lawful opportunity to confirm or dispel his suspicion. Id. Under this
standard, Dix contended, it is unlikely that Officer Rose reasonably believed he might
confirm or dispel his suspicion that Dickerson was in possession of narcotics without
conducting a search of Dickerson's person. Id.
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of the opinion reveals a far more significant implication. In addition to expanding upon the lawful object of an officer's seizure, the
Court, implicitly but significantly, expanded upon the lawful motive behind a Terry frisk.2 2 °
Notwithstanding Tery's warning that a lawful frisk could be
implemented only pursuant to a reasonable belief that a suspect
was armed and dangerous, and in complete disregard of Officer
Rose's admission that he intended to frisk Dickerson for narcotics, 221 the Dickerson Court concluded that Rose's frisk, at least at its
inception, was lawful.22 2 Apparently placated by Officer Rose's testimony that he intended to couple his narcotics search with a
search for weapons, the Court did not delve into the issue of
whether the weapons search was an incident of the stop or whether
the stop was an incident of Officer Rose's desire to conduct a narcotics search. 2 3 In so doing, however, the Court failed to acknowledge one rather commonsensical reality: where an officer stops an
individual based on a reasonable suspicion that the individual is in
possession of narcotics, the only means of confirming or dispelling
Id. at 41.
Officer Rose's testimony revealed that he instructed "his partner to pull the
squad car into the alley so he could 'check [the defendant] for weapons and contraband.'" State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Minn.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 53
(1992), affd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
222 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2139 (1993). The Dickerson Court disposed of this issue in a cursory fashion, choosing instead to concentrate on the ultimate scope of the frisk. Id. at 2138.
223 See Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2138. Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court treated
Officer Rose's narcotics search as if it were a simple weapons frisk. Dix, supra note 34,
at 41. The record clearly indicates, however, that this was not the case. Id. When
Officer Rose directed his partner to follow Dickerson into the alley, he forthrightly
announced his intent to search Dickerson for both weapons and drugs. Id. Clearly
then, Rose intended to search Dickerson to that extent necessary to determine
whether or not Dickerson was carrying narcotics. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court,
however, interpreted United States Supreme Court case law as rendering an officer's
motive irrelevant to the reasonableness of his conduct. Id. Therefore, the Minnesota
Supreme Court (and later the United States Supreme Court) reasoned that if Rose's
search was no more intrusive than a protective weapons search, his actions would be
unaffected by his apparent intention to search in a manner that could only be justified by a license to search for narcotics. Id.; Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2138-39.
This approach, Dix asserted, is absurd and threatens judicial integrity. Id. The
Court's role in a case such as Dickersonis to provide ajudicial review of police conduct.
Id. This review is surely tainted and ineffective when the Court delves into artificial
characterizations for the sake of complicity. Id. Given the difficulty of examining an
individual's motives, the Court has commonly suggested that an officer's motives are
irrelevant to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Id. While
Dix anticipated that the Dickerson Court would disclaim this extraordinary suggestion,
the Court failed to do so. See id. at 2135-39. Not surprisingly, the Court skirted the
issue so to best avoid the difficulties inherent in its analysis.
220
221
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that suspicion is to conduct the sort of evidentiary frisk that was
strictly prohibited in Teny.22 4 Therefore, when an officer stops an
individual to investigate a potential possessory offense, it is more
likely than not that the stop was prompted by a desire to search for
narcotics. The practical effect of the Dickerson ruling, therefore, is
that an officer may search a suspect for narcotics so long as the
officer does so under the guise of conducting a protective weapons
search.
While the concept of motive is often an elusive notion, the
difficulties of inquiring into one's motive could be minimized by
placing a burden on defendants to show that police officers acted
with a disqualifying intention. 225 Where the defendant can demonstrate, however, as Timothy Dickerson did, that the searching officer initiated a search with a clear intent to go beyond that which
is permitted by the Fourth Amendment, that alone should render
the officer's search unreasonable, and should entitle the defendant
to suppression of the proceeds.2 2 6
The Supreme Court might further minimize the burdens of a
motive inquiry, particularly in the case of a "plain feel" seizure, by
returning to the abandoned "inadvertency" requirement of the
"plain view" doctrine.2 2 7 By mandating fortuitous discovery, the
"inadvertency" requirement served as a safeguard against potential
224 Dix, supra note 34, at 41. As Dix pointed out, "[v]ery seldom will an officer like
Rose have reason to believe that stopping a person suspected of being in possession of
drugs will, by legitimate investigatory means, produce evidence confirming this." Id.
In cases of suspected narcotics possession, such as Dickerson, however, the sole investigatory function served by a stop is the opportunity to conduct a search. Id. The likely
result is that officers who suspect an individual of narcotics possession will stop the
suspect and, under the guise of a protective weapons search, conduct an evidentiary
search for contraband. Id. Thus, instead of the search being a lawful incident of a
stop, the stop becomes an unlawful means for effectuating the officer's primary intent
to search for narcotics. Id. Recognizing this proposition, one Supreme CourtJustice
has proposed that the Court outiaw investigative Terry stops for suspected possessory
offenses. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 151 (1972) (Douglas,J., dissenting) ("I
share with Judge Friendly a concern that the easy extension of Terry v. Ohio ... to
'possessory offenses' is a serious intrusion on Fourth Amendment safeguards.").
225 Dix, supra note 34, at 41.
226 Id. The "exclusionary rule" authorizes the suppression or exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the exclusionary rule.
227 At its inception in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the "plain view" doctrine required
that an officer's discovery of items which were in his plain view, but which were
neither covered by a warrant nor an exception thereto, be inadvertent. Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468-69 (1971) (footnote omitted). Although this
prong of the "plain view" test was later eliminated in Horton v. California, its application in the case of a "plain feel" seizure is both appropriate and useful. See Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 139 (1990). For a discussion on the establishment, development, and subsequent modification of the "plain view" doctrine, see supra note 10.
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abuse of the "plain view" doctrine. Specifically, the "inadvertency"
requirement ensured that an officer who was aware of evidence,
and who intended to seize that evidence, would not be able to capitalize on the "plain view" doctrine by deliberately placing himself
in a position from which to observe the evidence in plain view.22 8
Similarly, imposing an inadvertency requirement on a "plain feel"
seizure would minimize abuse by preventing the officer from
searching for narcotics under the guise of a protective weapons
search.2 29 In other words, the "plain feel" doctrine would benefit
only an officer who inadvertently discovered contraband during
the course of a lawful weapons search.230 While this may be no
more than the Dickerson Court intended, its failure to strictly circumscribe application of the doctrine left the door open for future
abuse.
Although the Dickerson ruling would seem to be cause for celebration among those who pledge allegiance to the government's
camp, Dickerson's grant of law enforcement discretion was not
unencumbered. While the Court granted police officers the power
to seize contraband detected during a weapons search, the Court
restricted such seizures to those narrow instances in which the officer realizes that the discovered object is contraband before he

228 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469-71 & n. 26. In such a situation, the Court commented,
the exigent circumstances prompting the application of the plain view exception were
not present. Id. at 470-71. Therefore, the Coolidge Court concluded, it would rarely
be impracticable to obtain a warrant. Id. at 470. While the seizure of evidence in
plain view could be lawful where the discovery was inadvertent, the Court explained
that the "plain view" doctrine would be of no benefit "where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to

seize it .

. . ."

Id. at 470.

In the case of a "plain feel" seizure, imposition of an "inadvertency" requirement would ensure that only those officers who discover contraband during the
course of a lawful Teny frisk would benefit from the "plain feel" doctrine. See supra
note 174 (discussing various federal circuit and state courts that have recognized the
"plain feel" doctrine during a protective stop and frisk), Conversely, those officers
who initiate a search to discover contraband, with an intent to seize that contraband,
would not benefit from the "plain feel" doctrine, as their discovery was planned, or at
least anticipated. Cf. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 470 (concluding that the warrant requirement poses no inconvenience to police who know certain evidence will be in plain
view and therefore intend to seize it).
230 The implications that inhere in the "plain view" doctrine's "inadvertency" requirement are equally applicable to Dickerson's "plain feel" doctrine. Much like a
"plain view" seizure case, imposing an "inadvertency" requirement in an alleged
"plain feel" seizure would make intent a dispositive factor. For example, if Officer
Rose solely intended to search Dickerson for weapons, his "plain feel" discovery of
contraband would have been unintentional, inadvertent, and a lawful predicate for a
subsequent seizure.
229
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realizes that it is not a weapon.23 1 In other words, an officer may
make a lawful seizure of contraband only if its incriminating character is "immediately apparent." 23 2 Reduced to its bottom-line implications, the Court's holding provides that the propriety of a
contraband seizure will turn on the amount of time that elapsed
before the officer recognized the contraband.2 3 3 For example,
where an officer discovers an object inside a suspect's pocket, and
the officer recognizes, within a second or two, that the object is
contraband, application of Dickerson would likely result in a lawful
seizure of that contraband. 23 4 Conversely, were the officer to recognize the contraband only after three seconds of tactile manipulation, a Dickerson analysis would likely prohibit a subsequent
seizure. 2 35 Therefore, the obvious difficulty which inheres in the
Dickerson rule derives from the impracticality of its application.
Surely a police officer cannot be expected to make such split-second timing judgments, particularly amidst the confusion that often
accompanies a stop and frisk. Similarly, attorneys and judges will
be hard pressed to apply the Dickerson rule.2 3 6 In sum, while the
Dickerson Court purported to enhance a police officer's discretion
by authorizing the seizure of contraband detected during a weap231 See Dripps, supra note 34, at 77 ("If an officer who is lawfully frisking a suspect
for weapons feels an object and realizes that it is probably contraband before he realizes that it is certainly not a weapon, then the object may be seized without a
warrant.").
232 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993). As Justice White reasoned: "If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an
object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been
no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's
search for weapons . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
233 Dripps, supra note 34, at 78. Dripps explained that the officer's protective weapons search ends the moment the officer realizes that the suspect is not harboring a
weapon. Id. (citation omitted). It is that moment, Dripps asserted, which becomes
crucial at a subsequent suppression hearing. Id.
234 See id. at 78. Distinguishing the Dickerson case from one in which an officer
immediately has probable cause to believe a suspect possesses contraband, Justice
White concluded that Officer Rose did not recognize the cocaine in Dickerson's
pocket before manipulating it. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2138-39.
235 The Dickerson Court concluded that Rose's seizure of Dickerson's crack cocaine
was unlawful because the officer "determined that the lump was contraband only after
,squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of [Dickerson's]
pocket'-a pocket which the officer already knew contained no weapon." Id. at 2138
(quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn.), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 53 (1992), affd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993)).
236 Dissenting in part, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized the application problem
created by the Dickerson rule, and accordingly would have remanded the case for a
more explicit finding on the probable cause issue. Id. at 2141 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ons search, the practical effect of the Court's ruling was to take
away with one hand that which it had given with the other.
Prosecuting attorneys who face suppression hearings governed
by Dickerson will be well advised to focus upon the investigating officer's testimony. Ideally, the seizing officer will testify, in no uncertain terms, that he or she "'felt a vial of crack cocaine' or 'felt a
bag of marijuana.' 23 7 Any equivocation, such as "I felt what I
thought might be a bag containing a powdery substance" will suggest that additional manipulation of the object was necessary to determine that the item was in fact contraband.2 38 Under Dickerson,
such a choice of words will be fatal to the prosecution's "plain feel"
case. 239 Cases involving the seizure of crack cocaine will be easier
to prosecute than those involving marijuana, heroin, or powder cocaine simply because the harder the item, the more thoroughly an
officer may manipulate it before dismissing the possibility that it is
a gun or a knife.2 4 °
The defense attorney, however, must strive to shake the investigating officer's claim that he was aware of the drugs before the
weapons search ended. 24 1 Thus, it will be critical for the defense to
focus on how the officer knew the suspect's garments held narcotics. 2 4 2 Every detail disclosed by the investigating officer on crossDripps, supra note 34, at 78.
Id.
239 At trial, Officer Rose testified: "'As I pat searched the front of his body, I felt a
lump, a small lump in the front pocket [of the defendant's nylonjacket]. I examined
it with my fingers and slid it and felt it to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane.'"
Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 842-43. Based on this testimony, however, the Dickerson Court
upheld the reversal of Dickerson's conviction, finding that Officer Rose's seizure of
the cocaine was unlawful. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139.
237
238

240 Dripps, supra note 34, at 78. Dripps noted, however, that an experienced narcotics officer might feel a bag of marijuana or heroin through a suspect's garment
and know immediately that the object is not a weapon but that it is contraband. Id.
The standard which permits an officer to extend his search is probable cause, not
certainty, which may be supported by every fact known to the officer at the time of the

frisk, including the incident's location and the history of the suspect. Id. Such circumstances, Dripps concluded, would support a showing of probable cause. Id.
Dripps's reasoning is in accord with United States v. Cortez, where the Court stated
that an officer is entitled to make an assessment of the "totality of the circumstances"
surrounding a stop and frisk to determine the lawfulness of his actions. United States
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).

Similarly, a reviewing court must weigh the

collected evidence as understood by those versed in the area of law enforcement. Id.
at 418. For a discussion of the Cortez opinion, see supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text. The Dickerson analysis is flawed, therefore, by the Court's failure to consider
Officer Rose's experience as a veteran narcotics officer. See Dripps, supra note 34, at
78.
241 Dripps, supra note 34, at 78.
242 Id.
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examination will intimate that the officer's search exceeded the
permissible bounds marked by Dickerson.243 Unlike the prosecution, the defense will favor those cases in which the investigating
officer seized a bag of marijuana, heroin, or cocaine.2 4 4
The Dickerson Court's analysis is further flawed by its rather
hypocritical disregard for its prior holding in Cortez v. United
States.24 5 The Cortez Court held that a trained officer could draw
upon his experiences in determining whether the requisite level of
cause existed to justify police action,2 4 6 and that a reviewing court
must weigh the collected evidence as understood by those versed in
the field of law enforcement. 247 The Dickerson Court, however,
failed to consider Officer Rose's experience as a veteran narcotics
officer when Justice White determined that Rose did not have
probable cause to seize Dickerson's cocaine. 248 Had Justice White
243 Id. For example, an officer's indication that he felt marijuana seeds in a plastic
bag would suggest that his search was lengthy and detailed. Id. A likely conclusion,
therefore, is that the officer's search continued even after he was assured that the
item was not a weapon. Id.
244 Id. Again, Dripps contended that where the seized contraband was soft, it is
more likely that the seizing officer was immediately aware that the object was not a
weapon. Id. Therefore, the commentator concluded that the officer would be less
justified in executing a lengthy search. Id.
245 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
246 Id. at 417. The Cortez Court explained that an officer is entitled to draw upon
his past experience, and to make inferences and deductions based on his experience
and the facts before him. Id. at 418. The officer is further entitled to piece together
all of the information at his disposal. Id. at 419. If the officer's analysis of the situation then leads him to believe that crime is afoot, or that a particular person is engaging in criminal activity, the officer is justified in taking action. Id. at 417-18.
247 Id. at 418. In other words, the Cortez Court stated that, in determining whether
a police officer was justified in taking a specific action, a reviewing court must consider the "totality of the circumstances." Id. at 417. As Dripps noted:
[1]t is arguable that an experienced narcotics officer might feel a bag of
heroin or marijuana through the suspect's clothing and know, in the
same instant, both that it is not a weapon and that it is a bag of drugs.
The standard that allows a closer search is probable cause, not moral
certainty, and all the facts known to the officer, like the location of the
stop and the history of the suspect, can be used to support a showing of
probable cause.
Dripps, supra note 34, at 78.
248 See Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2130-41. Determining that Officer Rose lacked the
requisite probable cause to continue searching Dickerson's pocket or to remove the
crack cocaine, Justice White failed to consider Rose's training and past experience.
See id. at 2138-39. For example, Justice White did not acknowledge that Officer Rose
was a 14-year veteran with the Minneapolis Police Department. But see State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), af'd, 481 N.W.2d 840 (Minn.), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 53 (1992), aftd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993). Similarly, the Dickerson
Court did not appear to give due regard to the fact that, during his tenure with the
police department, Officer Rose had participated in approximately 75 drug search
warrant executions and between 50 to 75 drug-related arrests. But see id. Likewise, the
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properly incorporated the "totality of the circumstances" into his
probable cause determination, it is likely that the Justice would
have concluded that Officer Rose was immediately aware that the
object in Dickerson's pocket was cocaine. Accordingly, the majority should have remanded the case for further findings on the
249
probable cause issue.
The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
reached a crisis situation, and it is time for the Court to bring order
to an area of law which is presently plagued by ambiguous decisions and absurd results. 250 The Court's recent Fourth Amendment holdings demonstrate the majority's desire to break out of
the bounds marked by Terry, and to trim individual Fourth Amendment rights to free the hands of law enforcement. 21 While the
propriety of such a shifting of power is questionable, if shifting is
indeed the majority's objective, the Court would be well advised to
do so forthrightly. 5 2 Unfortunately, the Court has instead engaged in irrational, piecemeal decisionmaking that has provided
Court apparently did not deem important Officer Rose's past experiences in the very
location where the officers observed Dickerson. But see id. at 465. Specifically, Rose
himself had previously executed several drug search warrants at the Morgan Avenue
apartment building, and had found both drugs and weapons at that location. But see
id. As a result of this experience, Officer Rose had first-hand knowledge that the
apartment building was known for drug trafficking. Id. More importantly, on the
night in question, Officers Rose and Johnson were monitoring the location pursuant
to a local alderman's complaint of drug related activities. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at
842. InsteadJustice White merely relied on the findings of the lower courts in determining that Rose lacked the requisite probable cause. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2138.
249 See Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2141 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Dickerson, see
supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
250 See Cox et al., supranote 8, at 648 (stating that the Supreme Court's recent stop
and frisk rulings have created confusion in a once well-settled area of Fourth Amend-

ment jurisprudence).
251 See Benner, supra note 4, at 825 ("Recent decisions of the Supreme Court...
have so diminished our expectations of privacy that the Amendment's original function has become distorted and lost from view. This has resulted in a subtle yet significant shift in the distribution of power between the individual citizen and her
government."); Serr, supra note 4, at 584 ("[T]he Court's means of promoting law
enforcement interests has tipped the balance unnecessarily further and further away
from individual freedom, significantly diminishing the realm of personal privacy.").
252 As one group of commentators noted:
The current approach of gradually eroding settled constitutional law
will only result in further uncertainty and confusion for those who must
apply these evolving principles to the day-to-day conduct of crime prevention and control. If a majority of the Court believes that a new, less
stringent standard for warrantless seizures and searches is appropriate,
it should so state and settle the question with clarity and certainty.
Cox et al., supranote 4, at 680. For further commentary in accordance with this view,
see Lampson, supra note 93, at 336 (stating that the Court should draw some bright
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little guidance to the law enforcement officer whom the Court,
ironically, intends to benefit.2 5 Perhaps it is time for the Court to
state, unequivocally, that an officer may not only stop a suspect, but
may also automatically search for both weapons and contraband. 5 4
Regretfully, the Dickerson opinion was just another step in the
wrong direction.
Stacey Paige Rappaport

lines in stop and frisk jurisprudence); Windmueller, supra note 70, at 562 (noting that
it is time for the Court to clarify the proper standard for a Terry stop and frisk).
253 See Oberly, supra note 1, at 653 (commenting that the Court's lack of guidance
to police officers is particularly troubling in light of the officers' duty to make splitsecond decisions in the field); Cox et al., supra note 8, at 680 (noting that the
Supreme Court has taken an incremental approach to effectuate change within
Fourth Amendment law); Windmueller, supra note 70, at 543 (stating that the
Supreme Court has failed to announce a coherent and practical procedure for law
enforcement officers to follow when conducting a stop and frisk).
254 See Dutile, supra note 70, at 869 (suggesting that the Supreme Court should
candidly rule that a law enforcement officer may frisk any person whom the officer
reasonably suspects is in possession of weapons or other contraband that the officer
might discover through a pat-down search).

